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The objective of this report is to document China’s productivity performance since 1978 and 
determine its impact on poverty.  The report finds that China has made substantial progress in 
economic development since economic reform started in 1978. Strong economic growth has been 
fuelled by rapid productivity growth, and has been accompanied by impressive declines in the 
incidence of poverty.  Productivity performance has not been uniform across the agricultural and 
industrial sectors, but both have contributed to aggregate growth and poverty reduction.  
Unfortunately economic reform has also brought increasing income inequality, mostly between 
rural and urban areas but also within both rural and urban areas and across regions as well.  
Labour productivity is found to have had a strong negative effect on poverty in China, with 
productivity increases in the industrial sector more important for poverty reduction than those in 
the agricultural sector.  The econometric results do not show that trends in inequality have a 
significant effect on poverty.  However, the process of economic growth, besides bringing the 
benefits of productivity increases, also brings structural adjustments that exacerbate income 
inequality through displacing workers.  The government of China has an important role to play in 
further developing a social security system that will ensure the gains from productivity are more 
equally shared, thus maintaining a healthy and equitable society in which further productivity 
gains can be realized.  
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The objective of this report is to document China’s productivity performance since 1978 and 
determine its impact on poverty.  The report finds that China has made substantial progress in 
economic development since economic reform started in 1978. During the past two decades, 
China’s real GDP has increased at an average annual rate of more than 9 per cent and average per 
capita income has quadrupled. Accompanying the rapid growth of the national economy in China 
has been an astounding achievement in the reduction of poverty, especially rural poverty. Based 
on the government’s definition of poverty, between 1978 and 2000, the number of 
poverty-stricken people in rural areas without enough food to eat and clothes to wear decreased 
from 250 million to 30 million; and the proportion of poverty-stricken people in the total rural 
population dropped from 30.7 per cent to about 3.4 per cent. 
 
This great achievement in economic growth and poverty reduction is shown here to be due 
in large part to productivity improvements. The paper is divided into three parts: the first looks at 
how productivity growth in different sectors contributes to rapid economic growth in China in the 
ongoing transition period; the second seeks to understand Chinese poverty and how it was 
affected by productivity growth; and the third considers the outlook for sustainable productivity 
growth and the role government could play to support a healthy economy. 
 
Over the 1978-2001 period labour productivity in China advanced at a rate of 6.6 per cent 
per year, contributing 70 per cent of output growth (9.4 per cent per year) and 81 per cent of 
growth in per capita income (8.1 per cent per year).  The economic reforms begun in 1978, 
including measures to give more decision-making authority to managers and allow redundant 
workers to be laid off, fuelled these productivity gains.  However, productivity performance over 
this period was not uniform across industries. 
 
The agricultural sector experienced productivity growth of only 4.7 per cent per year 
between 1978 and 2000, and in 2001 had a productivity level of only 30.4 per cent relative to the 
total economy average.  The industrial sector’s labour productivity level in 2001, on the other 
hand, was 229.1 per cent of the national average. 
 
Both state-owned and collective-owned enterprises in the industrial sector have shown 
strong productivity gains since 1978, especially in the latter 1990s when the laying off of 
redundant workers was allowed.  However, other ownership structures such as foreign funded and  
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private enterprises have become increasingly more important in the industrial sector.  Although no 
disaggregated data are available on the productivity performance of private and foreign 
companies, they are believed to have had a large positive effect on industrial and aggregate labour 
productivity increases, and will likely continue this positive influence through efficient 
production practices and high levels of investment. 
 
Accompanying this stellar productivity performance has been an equally impressive decline 
in the incidence of poverty in China.  Poverty has typically been regarded as strictly a rural 
problem in China, but according to official statistics the rural poverty rate fell from 30.7 per cent 
to about 3.4 per cent between 1978 and 2001.  These official estimates have been criticized as 
underestimating the extent of rural poverty, but in any case several other data sources indicate the 
same large declines in rural poverty incidence. 
 
Estimates of urban poverty rates do not exist for long time periods, and there is much debate 
surrounding recent attempts at quantifying urban poverty due to disagreement over who should be 
counted as poor.  Nonetheless, there appears to have been a reduction in urban poverty as well 
throughout the 1990s, according to the data that are available. 
 
Economic reform and the consequent strong output and productivity gains have 
unfortunately brought income inequality as well.  There are large income gaps in China, between 
rural and urban areas, within both rural and urban areas, and across provinces as well. The 
national Gini coefficient actually fell from 0.33 in 1980 to 0.28 in 1991, but has steadily increased 
since then. The Gini coefficient exceeded the “warning line” of 0.4 in 1996, as stressed by the 
Government of China. Since 1996, the coefficient has still shown no signs of declining. 
Meanwhile, we observe that if rural and urban are treated as separate categories, neither of them 
manifests inequality as severe as the nation as a whole. In this sense, China’s income inequality is 
mainly one of rural-urban inequality. 
 
However, there have been strong upward trends in inequality within both rural and urban 
areas, and if current trends continue, the Gini coefficients related to urban and rural areas could hit 
the warning line in 2010. China is famous for its huge labour endowment. Thus although higher 
productivity resulted in income increases of those who stayed employed, the increases were at the 
expense of those who lost the opportunity to work. 
 
Neither have the benefits from rapid economic growth been spread equally across the 
regions, due for example to the adoption of preferential regional policies. For example, for a long 
time an open-door policy was only applied to coastal cities all of which are located in eastern 
areas. Those open-door regions accumulated capital resources more easily and quickly compared 
to other regions. In addition, the open regions used their resources more efficiently, further adding 




Using official labour productivity data and poverty and inequality data from the World Bank, 
estimates of the effect of productivity and inequality on poverty are developed.  Productivity is 
found to have a strong negative effect on poverty in China, although when controlling for different 
productivity levels across sectors it is found that industrial labour productivity is the key driver of 
reductions in poverty. The weak positive relationship observed between agricultural labour 
productivity and poverty in the 1990s might reflect a terms of trade effect: agricultural prices 
when compared with urban industrial prices are unreasonably low so that rural people cannot 
obtain a corresponding benefit from productivity increases.  Trends in income inequality appear to 
have no substantial effect on poverty in China.  Despite some statistical weaknesses, we still have 
confidence in the main conclusion that productivity increases have played a key role in reducing 
poverty in China. 
 
In order to continue its strong productivity performance and further improve its record on 
poverty reduction, China needs to continue with its economic reforms and more fully utilize its 
labour resources through improved skills acquisition in the population.  More importantly, to 
ensure that the gains from economic growth are shared more equally across society, the 
government needs to take a stronger role in developing the recently implemented basic social 
security system.  The economic growth process brings a huge potential for increasing incomes 
through productivity growth, but by its nature also brings structural adjustment that creates 
inequality through displacing workers, which in turn can create instabilities in society.  A 
well-developed social security system is the key to sharing the gains from growth more equally 
and maintaining a healthy society.  An appendix documents the success China has had thus far in 
implementing such a system. Reforms aimed at making the taxation system more equitable are 
also required for addressing the inequality issue.  
 
10
LIST OF TABLES AND CHARTS 
 
TABLES 
Table 1-1: Basic Statistics on the Chinese Economy, 1978-2001  14 
Table 1-2: PPPs, and Real GDP, Real GDP per capita and Real GDP per worker at 1978 PPP  15 
Table 1-3: Distribution of GDP and Employment by Sector in China, 1978-2001  18 
Table 1-3A: Relative Labour Productivity by Sector, 1978-2001  19 
Table 1-4:  Agricultural Labour Productivity, 1978-2000  21 
Table 1-5: Gross Output by Ownership Structure for the Industrial Sector, 1978-1999  23 
Table 1-6: Output, Employment and Labour Productivity in Chinese State-owned Enterprises, 1980-2001  24 
Table 1-7: Fixed Assets of Chinese State-owned Industrial Enterprises, 1980-2001  27 
Table 1-8: TFP index of Chinese SOEs, 1980-2000  28 
Table 1-9: Industrial Structure of Non-agricultural TVEs in 1996  30 
Table 1-10:  Output, Employment and Labour Productivity in Collective-owned 
Industrial Enterprises, 1980-1999  31 
Table 1-11: Labour Productivity Comparison Between Primary and Secondary Industry. 1980-2000  35 
Table 1-12: Labour Productivity Comparison for Industrial Enterprises by Ownership  36 
Table 2-1: Chinese Poverty Statistics  37 
Table 2-2:  Basic Statistics on the Urban/Rural Split in the Chinese Population, 1978-2001  38 
Table 2-3:  Official Rural Poverty Statistics  39 
Table 2-4: World Bank Estimates of Chinese Rural Poverty  40 
Table 2-5: NBS Estimations of Urban Poverty  41 
Table 2-6:  Average Annual Net Income per capita  of Rural Chinese, 1978-2001  43 
Table 2-7: Average Annual Disposable Income per capita  of Urban Chinese, 1978-2001  44 
Table 2-8: Gini coefficients in China, 1978-2000  46 
Table 2-9:  Regional GDP per capita, 1978-2001  48 
Table 2-10: GDP per capita Indexes across Regions  49 
Table 2-11: Estimation Results from the Regression of Poverty on Productivity and Income Inequality  51 
Table 2-12:  Estimation Results from the Regression of Poverty on Productivity and Income Inequality  51 
Table 3-1: Promotion Rate of Regular School by Level & Type of Graduates  55 
Table A1-1:  Estimates of Capital and Labour Elasticities for SOEs, 1980-2001  62 
Table A2-1: Levels of China’s GDP, population and per capita GDP  64 
Table A2-2: Comparison of Maddison’s Estimates and Official Estimates  65 
Table A2-3: Growth Comparison of China’s GDP and per capita GDP  66 
Table A3-1   Number of Contributors and Beneficiaries In the New Pension System (1992-2002)  69 
Table A3-2: Financial Statistics of Old-age Pension System (1992-2002)  70 
Table A3-3: Statistics of the Unemployment Insurance System  73 
Table A3-4: Statistics of Health Insurance System (1998-2002)  74 
Table A3-5: The Thresholds for Receipt of Minimum Living Standard Security in 
36 Major Chinese Cities (2002)  76 
Table A3-6 Number of Beneficiaries in the Minimum Living Standard Security System (1996-2002)  77  
 
11
Table A3-7 New Features of the Chinese Social Insurance System  78 
Table A3-8 : Regulations and Guidelines of Social Insurance and Social Relief  80 
 
CHARTS 
Chart 1-1: Agricultural Labour Productivity, 1978-2000  22 
Chart 1-2: Trends in Output, Employment and Output per Worker in SOEs, 1980-2001  25 
Chart 1-3: Comparison of SOE Labour Productivity and TFP  29 
Chart 2-1:  Trend in Rural Poverty, 1978-2001  40 
Chart 2-2: Urban/rural Real Income Ratio Index  45 
 
CHINA’S PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON 





It is widely recognized that China has made substantial progress in economic development 
since economic reform started in 1978. During the past two decades, China’s real GDP has 
increased at an average annual rate of more than 9 per cent and average per capita income has 
quadrupled.   
 
Accompanying the rapid growth of the national economy in China has been an astounding 
achievement in the reduction of poverty, especially rural poverty. Based on the government’s 
definition of poverty, between 1978 and 2000, the number of poverty-stricken people in rural 
areas without enough food to eat and clothes to wear decreased from 250 million to 30 million; 
and the proportion of poverty-stricken people in the total rural population dropped from 30.7 per 
cent to about 3.4 per cent (Government of China, 2001).       
 
This great achievement in economic growth was due in large part to productivity 
improvements. The objective of this paper is to examine China’s productivity performance since 
1978 and its impact on poverty. In considering China’s complicated reform experience, this paper 
separates the whole Chinese economy into several sectors and investigates how productivity 
changed in these different sectors throughout the reform period. There are ample statistics 
showing that for most of the sectors, productivity increased rapidly.    
    
Higher productivity resulted in higher incomes leading to a reduction in China’s poverty. 
Empirical findings from 1990s data strongly support this relationship and also provide evidence 
that only industrial productivity improvements had a significant effect on poverty reduction while 
                                                        
1 This paper was written by Wei Chang with the supervision of Andrew Sharpe.  
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agricultural productivity improvements did not. 
 
This paper also examines growing income inequality in China and whether or not it affects 
poverty. The phenomenon of income inequality and its potential to cause social problems is one 
that many are reluctant to acknowledge.  
 
The paper is divided into three parts: the first looks at how productivity growth in different 
sectors contributes to rapid economic growth in China in the ongoing transition period; the second 
seeks to understand Chinese poverty and how it was affected by productivity growth; and the third 
considers the outlook for sustainable productivity growth and the role government could play to 




PART ONE: EFFECT OF ECONOMIC REFORM ON PRODUCTIVITY 
 
1.1 Productivity Performance at the Aggregate Level    
 
Chinese economic reform has been going on for 24 years. This period witnessed continuous 
growth of the Chinese economy. In Table 1-1, we see that nominal GDP increased from 362.4 
billion yuan in 1978 to 9593.3 billion yuan in 2001. Real GDP increased at a 9.4 per cent average 
annual rate.
2 But total population growth during this period was much slower at 1.2 per cent per 
year, while employment grew at only 2.6 per cent.  
 
Based on aggregate data, we see that Chinese economic growth benefited from rapid labour 
productivity growth that reform helped to achieve. Indeed, output per worker advanced at a 6.6 
per cent average annual rate over the 1978-2001 period and accounts for 70 per cent of output 
growth. And as a developing country, productivity improvement is by far the most important way 
for China to sustain strong economic growth. 
 
Using the 1978 purchasing power parity (PPP) estimate from the Penn World Tables, we 
converted China’s real GDP, real GDP per capita and real GDP per worker into 1978 U.S. dollar 
values,
3 as shown in Table 1-2. According to these estimates, China in 1999 had a GDP per capita 
of $U.S.1113 expressed in 1978 constant prices.  Maddison (2001) estimates much larger GDP per 
capita levels (see Appendix 2). 
 
It is well known that Chinese economic reform is a very complicated process and the nature of 
reform has changed through time. Box 1 provides a simplified chronology of the economic reform 
in China since 1978, and for a discussion of these reforms from the perspective of the 
development of the social security system in China see Appendix 3. Although China 
demonstrated rapid productivity growth for the total economy, performance varies across 
industries. In order to better our understanding of the entire progress of productivity changes since 
reform, we need to investigate industry level performance. 
 
The Chinese economy is classified into three sectors: (1) primary industry, (2) secondary 
industry and (3) tertiary industry. Primary industry involves almost all agricultural production 
(including crop cultivation and animal husbandry), forestry and fishery production. Given the 
predominance of agricultural production, it is often called the agricultural sector. Secondary 
industry includes manufacturing, mining and quarrying, power production and supply and 
                                                        
2 Maddison (2001: Table C3-B) has estimated real GDP growth rates at only 7.3 per cent per year over the 1978-99 period, 2.1 
percentage points below the official estimates. Maddison (2001: Table C3-A) estimates population growth at 1.3 per cent per 
year for the same period, very similar to the official 1.2 per cent.  Because employment data are only available for limited time 
periods from Maddison (2001: Table E-2) it is not possible to compare productivity or employment growth directly with official 
estimates.  See Appendix 2 for both growth and level comparisons of Maddison’s GDP and per capita GDP estimates with 
official statistics. 
3 The reason that we the use 1978 PPP is that we have deflated nominal GDP at 1978 constant prices.  
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construction. The term industrial sector is used for secondary industry excluding construction. 
Tertiary industry, also called the service sector, covers all remaining industries with economic 
units in this sector mainly providing producer services and social services. 
 
Table 1-1: Basic Statistics on the Chinese Economy, 1978-2001 
 
Year  Nominal 
GDP 






















1978  362.4  362.4  401.5 962.6 376.5 902.6 
1980  451.8  420.4  423.6 987.1 425.9 992.4 
1985  896.4  699.1  498.7 1058.5 660.4 1401.7 
1986  1020.2  761.1  512.8 1075.1 707.9 1484.1 
1987  1196.3  849.1  527.8 1093.0 776.9 1608.7 
1988  1492.8  944.8  543.3 1110.3 851.0 1738.9 
1989  1690.9  983.2  553.3 1127.0 872.4 1777.0 
1990  1854.8  1020.9 647.5 1143.3  892.9 1576.7 
1991  2161.8  1114.8 654.9 1158.2  962.5 1702.2 
1992  2663.8  1273.5 661.5 1171.7  1086.9 1925.1 
1993  3463.4  1445.3 668.1 1185.2  1219.5 2163.4 
1994  4675.9  1628.3 674.6 1198.5  1358.6 2413.9 
1995  5847.8  1799.4 680.7 1211.2  1485.6 2643.6 
1996  6788.5  1971.9 689.5 1223.9  1611.2 2859.9 
1997  7446.3  2146.2 698.2 1236.3  1736.0 3073.9 
1998  7834.5  2314.0 706.4 1248.1  1854.0 3275.9 
1999  8206.8  2479.2 713.9 1259.1  1969.1 3472.6 
2000  8944.2  2676.4 720.9 1265.8  2114.3 3712.8 
2001  9593.3  2871.7 730.3 1276.3  2250.1 3932.5 
1978-2001 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
15.3 9.4 2.6 1.2  8.1  6.6 
1978-97 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
17.2 9.8 3.0 1.3  8.4  6.7 
1997-2001 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
6.5 7.6  1.1 0.8 6.7 6.4 
Source: Columns (1), (3), (4) are from the Statistical Yearbook of China, 2002 Table 3-1. Other columns are calculated 
       by the author.  
Note:  1. All output values are expressed in Chinese currency (yuan) and all real terms are in 1978 constant prices. 
       2. Since there is no official GDP deflator, we calculate real GDP values by multiplying the real GDP index listed in the      
Statistical Yearbook of China by the 1978 base year value.    
 
Table 1-3 provides a clear picture of the relative importance in terms of output and 
employment of each sector, and changes in their importance over the 1978-2001 period. The 
industrial sector has the largest output at almost the half of total economy GDP, and this share has 
been relatively stable over time. Agriculture’s output share has been decreasing as the service  
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1978  1.9  1.7 190.7 198.2 475.1 
1980  1.8  1.5 221.3 224.2 522.3 
1985  3.6  2.9 367.9 347.6 737.8 
1986  4.1  3.5 400.6 372.6 781.1 
1987  4.2  3.7 446.9 408.9 846.7 
1988  3.6  3.7 497.3 447.9 915.2 
1989  3.3  3.8 517.5 459.2 935.3 
1990  4.3  4.8 537.3 470.0 829.9 
1991  4.7  5.3 586.7 506.6 895.9 
1992  4.6 5.5  670.3  572.0  1013.2 
1993  4.2 5.8  760.7  641.8  1138.6 
1994  5.2 8.6  857.0  715.1  1270.5 
1995  4.4 8.4  947.0  781.9  1391.4 
1996  4.1 8.3  1037.8  848.0  1505.2 
1997  4.1 8.3  1129.6  913.7  1617.8 
1998  4.2 8.3  1217.9  975.8  1724.2 
1999  4.3  8.3  1304.9 1036.4 1827.7 
2000  4.3 8.3  1408.6  1112.8  1954.1 
  Source:  Columns (1) and (2) come from the Penn World Tables version 6.1, which can be downloaded from 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu. 
 
Examining changes in the employment structure, we find that employment in agricultural 
production declined sharply from 70.5 per cent in 1978 to 50.0 per cent in 2001, while the 
employment shares of the industrial sector and service sector both increased. This is especially 
true for the service sector, which employed more than one quarter of total labour in 2001, even 
more than the secondary sector. 
 
The ratio of a sector’s output share to employment share is an indicator of its relative 
productivity. A sector that accounted for 25 per cent of output and 25 per cent of employment 
would have average productivity. As sector whose output share exceeds its employment share has 
above average productivity while a sector whose output share is less than its employment share 




Table 1-3A shows that in 2001, the level of output per worker in agriculture was only 30.4 per 
cent of the national average, down from 39.9 per cent in 1978, implying that agricultural labour 
productivity growth was less than total economy labour productivity growth. In contrast, the level 
of output per worker in secondary industry was 229.1 per cent of the total economy average in 
2001, down from 278.6 per cent in 1978. In service, the level of output per worker was 121.3 per 









Simplified Chronology of Economic Reform in China since 1978 
Stage One (1978-1984) – Revitalization Period 
The 3
rd plenum of the 11
th Communist Party of China (CPC) congress central 
committee in December 1978 adopted an economic reform program that during 
the 1978-1984 period of time: 
•  Leased land to farmers under the household responsibility system; 
•  Lifted procurement prices for key crops; 
•  Introduced a dual price system for agricultural products; 
•  Encouraged diversification and specialization of crops; 
•  Introduced a profit retention system into state-owned enterprises on an 
experimental basis; and 
•  Applied an open-door policy by setting up special economic zones firstly 
in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen (later expanded to 14 cities).
Stage Four (1992-1997) – Reform deepening period 
The 14
th CPC congress central committee made clear that the basic objective of  
Chinese economic reform was the establishment of a social market economy. 
•  Experimental share-holding system was carried out in state enterprises. 
•  Introduction of a modern enterprise system. 
•  “8-7 plan” was launched (1994) as a poverty reduction plan that aimed to 
eliminate the 80 million rural poor within seven years in 592 poverty-stricken 
counties and raise per capita income to 500 yuan per year (in 1990 constant 
prices). 
•  The Asian crisis happened in 1997 
• The  15
th CPC congress central committee encouraged expansion of all kinds  
of non-state-owned enterprises in September 1997. 
Stage Two (1984-1988) – Reform Broadening Period 
The 3
rd plenum of the 12
th CPC congress central committee decided to expand 
economic reform to include urban enterprises in October 1984. 
•  The “contract responsibility system” was introduced to strengthen the 
responsibility and decision-making authority of managers. 
•  The enterprise tax system replaced the profit retention system. 
•  A new labour contract system pushed out the life-long labour system. 
•  The private sector was given formal permission to exist and develop 
within the regulated range. 
•  Severe inflation took place during 1987-1988. 
Stage Five (1998- present) – Reform Acceleration period 
•  Firms were encouraged to lay off redundant workers so as to improve  
efficiency. It was especially applied to state-owned enterprises. 
•  Became a member of WTO in 2001. 
•  A basic social security system was set up, consisting mainly of social  
insurance (old age pension, medical care insurance, unemployment  
insurance, working injury insurance and childbirth insurance), social relief 
(minimum living allowance), social welfare and special social care for  
disabled people. 
Stage Three (1989-1991) – Retrenchment period 
•  Aimed at combating inflation 
 
 
Note: see Appendix 3 for a detailed discussion of these economic reforms in 
the context of the development of a social security system in China.  
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        Souce: Statistical Yearbook of China, 2002, Table 3-2, Table 5-2 
 
The decline in the relative productivity of all three sectors is explained by the reallocation of 
labour from low productivity agriculture to the two other much higher productivity level sectors. 
This inter-sectoral employment shift contributed significantly to aggregate productivity growth 
and raised the aggregate labour productivity level of the total economy. 
 
1.2 Reform in the Agricultural Sector  
Chinese economic reform began in the agricultural sector in 1978. This sector had been heavily 
repressed under central planning and reform in this sector was very successful. The major reforms 
were to introduce the household responsibility system
4 (HRS) and increase procurement prices for 
                                                        
4 The household responsibility system (HRS), implemented over 1979-1984, was intended to solve problems of poor motivation and 
Table 1-3: Distribution of GDP and Employment by Sector in China, 1978-2001 
 
Nominal GDP Share (%) 
 


















  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1978  100 28.1  48.2  23.7  70.5  17.3  12.2 
1979  100 31.2  47.4  21.4  69.8  17.6  12.6 
1980  100 30.1  48.5  21.4  68.7  18.2  13.1 
1981  100 31.8  46.4  21.8  68.1  18.3  13.6 
1982  100 33.3  45.0  21.7  68.1  18.4  13.4 
1983  100 33.0  44.6  22.4  67.1  18.7  14.2 
1984  100 32.0  43.3  24.7  64.0  19.9  16.1 
1985  100 28.4  43.1  28.5  62.4  20.8  16.8 
1986  100 27.1  44.0  28.9  60.9  21.9  17.2 
1987  100 26.8  43.9  29.3  60.0  22.2  17.8 
1988  100 25.7  44.1  30.2  59.4  22.4  18.3 
1989  100 25.0  43.0  32.0  60.0  21.6  18.3 
1990  100 27.1  41.6  31.3  60.1  21.4  18.5 
1991  100 24.5  42.1  33.4  59.7  21.4  18.9 
1992  100 21.8  43.9  34.3  58.5  21.7  19.8 
1993  100 19.9  47.4  32.7  56.4  22.4  21.2 
1994  100 20.2  47.9  31.9  54.3  22.7  23.0 
1995  100 20.5  48.8  30.7  52.2  23.0  24.8 
1996  100 20.4  49.5  30.1  50.5  23.5  26.0 
1997  100 19.1  50.0  30.9  49.9  23.7  26.4 
1998  100 18.6  49.3  32.1  49.8  23.5  26.7 
1999  100 17.6  49.4  33.0  50.1  23.0  26.9 
2000  100 16.4  50.2  33.4  50.0  22.5  27.5 




5 The new farming system greatly increased the farmers’ incentives to produce, which 
led them to use their labour more effectively. The higher prices for agricultural 
 
 Table 1-3 A: Relative Labour Productivity by Sector, 1978-2001    
 








1978  39.9  278.6  194.3 
1979  44.7  269.3  169.8 
1980  43.8  266.5  163.4 
1981  46.7  253.6  160.3 
1982  48.9  244.6  161.9 
1983  49.2  238.5  157.7 
1984  50.0  217.6  153.4 
1985  45.5  207.2  169.6 
1986  44.5  200.9  168.0 
1987  44.7  197.7  164.6 
1988  43.3  196.9  165.0 
1989  41.7  199.1  174.9 
1990  45.1  194.4  169.2 
1991  41.0  196.7  176.7 
1992  37.3  202.3  173.2 
1993  35.3  211.6  154.2 
1994  37.2  211.0  138.7 
1995  39.3  212.2  123.8 
1996  40.4  210.6  115.8 
1997  38.3  211.0  117.0 
1998  37.3  209.8  120.2 
1999  35.1  214.8  122.7 
2000  32.8  223.1  121.5 
2001  30.4  229.1  121.3 
    Source: Columns (1), (2) and (3) are all calculated from Table 1-3. 
 
products helped to maintain higher productivity. Meanwhile, agricultural reform encouraged 
diversification and specialization of crops, together with stimulation of rural markets.  
•  Justin Lin (1992) estimated a production function and a supply response function to show the 
shift from the production-team system to HRS had a positive and significant effect on 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
bad management in agriculture by giving decision-making power and rights to income from work to the peasant household. The 
basic idea was that producer and manager should be the same and that the peasant producer had a strong claim to the fruit of 
his/her labour and the results of his/her decisions about production and investment. 
5 Grain and cotton were not included as they were still subject to mandatory targets.  
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agricultural growth, which came primarily from the more productive use of inputs. According 
to Lin, real agricultural output increased by 42.2 per cent between 1978 and 1984, and nearly 
half of the total growth was contributed by productivity change. 
•  McMillan et al. (1987) found that for the 28 per cent increase in total factor productivity of the 
agriculture sector between 1978 and 1984, about one-fourth was due to higher prices paid for 
farm production and three-fourths to changes in property rights and incentives. 
 
The evolution of agricultural productivity in China has not been continuous over the 1978-2000 
period. Labour productivity in the agricultural sector began to stagnate in the mid-1980s (Chart 
1-1). This stagnation can be explained partly by the fact that the HRS had only a short-term level 
impact on productivity without inducing productivity-enhancing, long-term investments. In 
addition, there was no major technological change in Chinese agriculture production in the late 
1980s.  
Another reason for the stagnation was the uncertainty of land usage rights. In China, all land 
belongs to the government. Even under HRS, farmers were only given the right to use the land for 
a limited number of years. Although in 1985 the government permitted the extension of leasing to 
15 years, the policy was not applied effectively (Prosterman et al., 1996). In many counties and 
villages, land was recollected every 3-6 years and re-allocated according to changes in household 
size. The result was that the farmers rejected long-term renovation. 
Starting in the 1990s, agricultural productivity recovered from stagnation, as shown in Chart 
1-1. The recovery was not surprising because during the previous decade, the government had 
made greater efforts to improve agricultural product markets and to strengthen the use of advanced 
technology to accelerate the development of high quality and pollution-free agricultural products in 
rural areas. In terms of total agricultural productivity growth in the past decade, technological 
progress contributed about 45 per cent (Zhang, 2000). 
At the same time, structural adjustment of the agricultural sector reallocated rural labour to 
higher-demand animal husbandry and fishery production. Farmers no longer concentrated on just 
crop cultivation. This adjustment in the product mix meant that the labour and capital inputs 
yielded higher returns. 
 
1.3 Reform in the Industrial Sector 
 
Industrial sector reform is at the heart of Chinese economic reform. In 2000, industrial output 
reached 1.26 trillion yuan. However, although little doubt was cast on this impressive achievement, 
some people believed that the rapid industrial development in China was mainly due to more 
intensive use of inputs not productivity improvement. To assess this situation here we need to look 
at the impact of reform on different types of industrial enterprises.   
  
Chinese industrial production is carried out in several ways: 
• State-owned enterprises (SOEs) where the means of production or income   are owned by 
the state.   
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• Collective-owned enterprises (COEs) where the means of production are owned 
collectively. These include urban and rural enterprises invested in by collectives and 
enterprises which  
 




























1978  101.8 100.0  101.8  283.2  359.6 
1979  125.9 122.1  103.1  286.3  360.1 
1980  135.9 130.8  103.9  291.2  356.9 
1981  154.6 138.5 111.6  297.8  374.7 
1982  176.2 141.5  124.5  308.6  403.4 
1983  196.1 147.7  132.8  311.5  426.2 
1984  229.6 153.6  149.5  308.7  484.1 
1985  254.2 166.8  152.4  311.3  489.5 
1986  276.4 177.5  155.7  312.5  498.3 
1987  320.4 198.8  161.2  316.6  509.1 
1988  383.1 244.5  156.7  322.5  485.9 
1989  422.8 281.2  150.4  332.3  452.5 
1990  501.7 273.9  183.2  389.1  470.8 
1991  528.9 268.4  197.0  391.0  503.9 
1992  580.0 277.5  209.0  387.0  540.1 
1993  688.2 314.7  218.7  376.8  580.4 
1994  945.7 440.3  214.8  366.3  586.4 
1995  1199.3 527.9 227.2  355.3  639.4 
1996  1384.4 550.1 251.7  348.2  722.8 
1997  1421.1 525.3 270.5  348.4  776.5 
1998  1455.2 483.3 301.1  351.8  855.9 
1999  1447.2 424.3 341.1  357.7  953.4 
2000  1462.8 409.0 357.7  360.4  992.4 
1978-2000 
Average Annual 
Growth rate (%) 
12.9 6.7 5.9  1.1 4.7 
1978-1990 
Average Annual 
Growth rate (%) 
14.2 8.8 5.0  2.7 2.3 
1990-2000 
Average Annual 
Growth rate (%) 
11.3 4.1 6.9 -0.8 7.7 
Source: 1. Columns (1), (2) and (4) come from the Statistical Yearbook of China 2002, Table 3-1, Table 5-5 and Statistical  
Yearbook 2000, Table 9-11. 
             2. Columns (3) and (5) are calculated by the author. 
Note:  Gross agricultural output is deflated using the agricultural goods procurement price index.   




were formerly owned privately but have been registered in an industrial and commercial 
administration agency as collective units through raising funds from the public. 
•  Other types of enterprises include those economic units that are owned or controlled by the 
private sector and that use domestic funds, namely private limited liability corporations, 
private share-holding corporations, private partnership enterprises and private sole 
investment enterprises, and foreign funded enterprises, including joint venture enterprises, 
cooperative enterprises, sole investment enterprises and limited liability corporations. 
Enterprises that receive funds from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are also included in this 
part. 
 



































































Source: Table 1-4 
  
1.3.1  Productivity performance of SOEs 
 
1.3.1.1  Labour and capital productivity 
 
Before economic reform began in 1978, SOEs accounted for the lion’s share of entire 
industrial production. After 1978, however, the production share of non-state-owned enterprise 
increased and surpassed that of the state sector. Table 1-5 clearly shows that in 1993, the industrial 
output share of SOEs was for the first time below 50.0 per cent, and in the following years, the ratio 
became smaller and smaller. By 1999, only 26.1 per cent of total output was accounted for by SOEs. 
However, a falling output share does not mean that the labour productivity of SOEs was declining. 
The real output of SOEs has been increasing for most of the past two decades (Table 1-6). Total 
real gross output reached 126.4 billion yuan (1980 prices) in 2001 as compared to 39.2 billion yuan 
in 1980, with an average annual growth rate of 5.7 per cent. After declining in 1997 and 1998,  
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output returned to rapid growth over the 1998-2001 period, advancing 10.4 per cent in 1999 and 
16.8 per cent in 2000. 
 Over the same period, i.e. 1998-2000, the employment level actually fell. Indeed 1993 was a 
watershed when labour employed in SOEs began declining. By 1997, employment was below the 
1987 level. Employment decreased even more sharply after 1997 as a result of the large-scale 
implementation of laid-off policy in China. This refers to the laying off of redundant employees in 
the interests of efficiency.  Employment fell by 32.7 per cent in 1998, followed by 11.4 per cent in 
1999, 12.9 per cent in 2000 and 13.3 per cent in 2001. 
 
  Table 1-5: Gross Output by Ownership Structure for the Industrial  











1978  77.6 22.4     
1980  76.0 23.5    0.5 
1983  77.0 22.5  6.7  0.5 
1984  74.0 25.0  7.7  1.0 
1985  64.9 32.1  14.6 3.0 
1986  62.3 33.5    4.2 
1987  59.7 34.6    5.7 
1988  56.8 36.1  16.3 7.1 
1989  56.1 35.7  16.4 8.2 
1990  54.6 35.6    9.8 
1991  56.2 33.0  17.8 10.8 
1992  51.5 35.1  20.7 14.4 
1993  47.0 34.0  21.8 19.0 
1994  37.3 37.7  25.3 24.9 
1995  34.0 36.6  25.9 29.5 
1996  33.7  36.5  27.7 29.8 
1997  29.8  35.9   34.3 
1998  26.5  36.0   37.5 
1999  26.1  32.8   41.1 
    Source: 1. Statistical Yearbook of China, 2000, Table 13-3, 13-4,  
           2. Statistic Yearbook of China 1998 Table 13-1 
           3. Statistical Yearbook of China 1996, Table 12-1 
 
 The divergent trends of output and employment provide us with strong evidence that the 
labour productivity of SOEs was increasing through reform especially after 1997, as shown in 
Chart 1-2. Labour productivity surged up 39.2 per cent in 1998, 24.5 per cent in 1999, 34.4 per cent 
in 2000 and 16.9 per cent in 2001. Over the 1997-2001 period, employment fell 55.0 per cent, 
                                                        
6 TVEs refer to Township and Village enterprises. They are owned by local citizens and controlled by township or village 
governments. Their behavior is regulated by local governments to varying degrees, but much less so than SOEs are. 
7 This includes all the other types of enterprises that are not state-owned or collective-owned.   
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output rose 22.8 per cent and output per worker increased an amazing 172.3 per cent. 
There is no doubt that reform has pushed China’s state-owned industrial enterprises into a 
growth path that is based on higher labour productivity but using more capital. We can find in Table 
1-7 that over the 1980-2001 period, real capital stock grew at an average annual rate of 7.9 per cent. 
Especially in 1998, the capital stock increased by 25.2 per cent from 1997, followed by 11.4 per 
cent in 1999, 6.7 per cent in 2000 and 7.4 per cent in 2001. 
 
Table 1-6: Output, Employment and Labour Productivity in Chinese 

























1980  39.2  100.0 39.2 33.3  1174.6 
1985  63.0  101.8 61.9 38.2  1622.7 
1986  69.7  110.7 63.0 39.6  1592.2 
1987  82.5  114.9 71.8 40.9  1757.3 
1988  103.5  123.9 83.5 42.3  1975.5 
1989  123.4  142.5 86.6 42.7  2027.1 
1990  130.6  169.0 77.3 44.7  1771.4 
1991  149.6  176.0 85.0 43.6  1900.1 
1992  178.2  186.9 95.43 45.2  2109.4 
1993  227.3  199.6 113.9 45.0  2531.2 
1994  262.0  247.5 105.9 43.7  2423.0 
1995  312.2  295.8 105.5 44.0  2400.4 
1996  361.7  339.8 106.5 42.8  2488.4 
1997  359.7  349.7 102.9 40.4  2545.9 
1998  336.2  348.6 96.4 27.2  3544.5 
1999  355.7  334.3 106.4 24.1  4411.5 
2000  405.5  326.3 124.3 21.0  5929.6 
2001  424.1  335.4 126.4 18.2  6932.0 
1980-2001 
Average Annual 
Growth rate (%) 
12.0 5.9  5.7  -2.8  8.8 
1980-1997 
Average Annual 
Growth rate (%) 
13.9 7.6  5.8  1.1  4.7 
1997-2001 
Average Annual 
Growth rate (%) 
4.2 1.0  5.2  -18.0  28.5 
Source: 1. Columns (1), (2) and (4) are from the Statistical Yearbook of China, 2000, Table 13-2, Table 13-3 and the 
Statistical Yearbook of China, 2002, Table 9-9, Table 13-1, Table 13-2. 
             2. Columns (3) and (5) are calculated by the author. 




However, in contrast to labour productivity, capital productivity of state-owned industrial 
enterprises in China has declined during most of the 1980-2001 period, over which an average 
annual growth rate of -1.7 was exhibited. Especially, the rapid capital stock growth over the 
1997-2001 period resulted in a continuous fall of capital productivity and the rate of decrease was 
more than 23.0 per cent.   
 
In addition, the capital/labour ratio of Chinese state-owned industrial enterprises shows an 
increasing trend. The growth is astounding between 1997 and 2001, when capital investment kept 
on rising while employment fell rapidly. 
 















Source: Table 1-6 
 
1.3.1.2  Trends in total factor productivity (TFP) 
 
Another widely adopted method to evaluate the reform impact on productivity performance is 
to examine how total factor productivity (TFP) changes as a result of reform. Several 
representative works, either using aggregate data or specific industrial level data, have tried to give 
reliable results. But it still remains contentious as to whether TFP increased or decreased because 
of estimation difficulties as the following works indicate.  
 
•  Chen et al. (1988) estimated TFP for the state industrial sector. They used time-series data of 
net output as dependent variables and estimated a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Applying those estimates of production elasticity of factor inputs from the production functions, 
they found that TFP growth was about 4.8-5.9 per cent per year between 1978 and 1985. 





•  Gary H. Jefferson and Thomas G. Rawski (1994) estimated a Cobb-Douglas function using 
aggregate data of the state sectors. According to their estimation results, average annual rates of 
growth of TFP were within the range of 2-4 per cent from 1980 to 1988. They also indicated 
that rising TFP was consistent with micro-level evidence of increases in both static and 
dynamic efficiency. Theodore Groves et al. (1994) estimated a joint production function for 
five representative industries in their sample set, and found a two-way causation between 
workers’ incentive and total factor productivity. 
 
•  Woo et al. (1994) did not find support for the view that TFP of the state industrial sector 
significantly increased. They applied various deflators to nominal output and inputs and 
obtained nearly zero TFP growth among large and medium SOEs between 1984 and 1988. 
 
•  Evidence from Y. Huang and X. Meng (1997) suggests that at least for the period 1986-1990, 
reform policies for the state industrial sector failed to stimulate productivity growth. TFP in fact 
decreased by 2 per cent per year. A real growth rate of 5.6 per cent was supported by more rapid 
expansion of factor inputs and such growth cannot be sustained. They concluded that more 
substantial reform measures are required to maintain a positive productivity growth in the state 
sector.  
      
There are many other related studies in the literature, but almost all use data from before 1995. 
The previous conclusions, even if they were fairly consistent, cannot make us believe that the most 
recent reform would necessarily have the same effects on TFP in the state sector. We have 








































1980  37.3  100.0 37.3  1049.8  1118.8 
1985  59.6  120.6 49.4  1253.7  1294.3 
1986  67.4  128.3 52.6  1198.3  1328.7 
1987  76.8  135.1 56.8  1263.3  1391.0 
1988  88.0  153.4 57.4  1456.7  1356.1 
1989  101.6  166.4 61.1  1418.3  1429.3 
1990  116.1  175.5 66.2  1168.5  1516.0 
1991  135.6  190.4 71.2  1193.4  1592.1 
1992  156.7  215.2 72.8  1309.4  1610.9 
1993  190.7  269.0 70.9  1606.5  1575.6 
1994  231.0  295.9 77.8  1360.7  1780.7 
1995  309.4  314.7 98.3  1073.6  2235.7 
1996  347.6  327.3 106.6  1002.2  2483.1 
1997  383.5  332.8 115.2  892.6  2852.1 
1998  479.1  332.2 144.2  668.6  5301.0 
1999  531.5  330.8 160.6  662.4  6659.9 
2000  573.0  334.5 171.3  725.6  8172.4 
2001  617.8  335.8 184.0  687.3  10086.2 
1980-2001 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
14.3 5.9  7.9  -1.7  11.0 
 1980-1997 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
14.7 7.3  6.9  -0.9  5.7 
1997-2001 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
12.7 0.2 12.4  -6.3  37.1 
Source: Columns (6) and (7) are from the Statistical Yearbook of China 1996, Table 12-17, the Statistical Yearbook of 
China, 2000,  Table 13-10, Table 9-14 and the Statistical Yearbook of China 2002, Table 13-11, Table 13-2, Table 
9-11 









Based on our own elasticities, i.e. 0.74 for the capital input and 0.67 for the labour input (see 
Appendix 1 for a derivation), the TFP index for SOEs during the period of 1980-2000 is given 
below: 
      
























1980-2000 Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%)  1.66 
1980-1997 Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%)  0.00 
1997-2000 Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%)  11.83 
  
We compare TFP growth with labour productivity growth in Chart 1-3. Both seem to follow 
the same pattern prior to 1997 but after that labour productivity grew much more rapidly than TFP. 
This is reasonable because after 1997, capital investment in SOEs did not decrease as employment 
did, but rather increased dramatically. The capital/labour ratio therefore surged (Table 1-7). As a 
result, TFP growth between 1997 and 2000 was much less than labour productivity growth , but 
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Source: Table 1-6 and Table 1-9 
 
1.3.2 Productivity performance of COEs  
 
Collective-owned enterprises (COEs) in China played a leading role in the reform of the 
non-state-owned sector. COEs refer to both urban collective-owned enterprises and to township 
and village enterprises (TVEs) in rural areas which actually accounted for much of the impressive 
output growth in this sector. As noted in Table 1-5, TVEs produced only 6.7 per cent of industrial 
output in 1983, but by 1996 were responsible for 27.7 per cent (more recent data are not available).  
 
It should be noted here that TVEs include enterprises that operate in industry, construction, 
transportation, commerce, trade and agriculture, that is, almost the entire rural economy except for 
the SOEs and urban controlled COEs operating in rural areas. Most TVEs concentrate on 
non-agricultural production, especially industrial production. By 1996, industrial production 
accounted for more than four fifths of TVEs’ total output. Table 1-9 shows the concentration within 
TVEs in the industrial sector relative to other sectors.  
 
Due to data constraints, a complete time-series of TVEs’ total output cannot be obtained. After 
1996, value added rather than gross output began to be reported so that the new measurements 







Table 1-9: Industrial Structure of Non-agricultural TVEs in 1996 
 




11.28  80.71 
Construction 
0.88  6.30 
Transportation and 
communications  0.24  1.74 
Wholesale and retail trade 
1.13  8.07 
Social services etc. 
0.44  3.18 
Total:  
13.97  100.00 
Source: Statistical communiqué (1996), National Bureau of Statistics 
 
Referring to the whole collective sector, the data in Table 1-10 shows that real gross output 
increased from less than 12.1 billon yuan in the beginning of reform to 133.5 billion yuan in 1999, 
at an average annual growth rate of 13.5 per cent. This spectacular growth cannot be explained 
without considering the remarkable contribution of increasing labour productivity in the collective 
sector.  
 
1.3.2.1 A literature review on the productivity growth of COEs  
 
A number of studies have found that COEs achieved impressive success in terms of 
productivity growth. For example: 
 
•  Jefferson and Rawski (1994) found that average annual TFP growth in the collective sector was 
3.4 per cent, 5.9 per cent, and 4.9 per cent for urban collective enterprises in the periods 
1980-1984, 1984-1988 and 1988-1992 respectively. For TVEs, the rates were 7.3 per cent, 6.6 
per cent and 6.9 per cent. Both urban COEs and TVEs had higher TFP growth rates when 
compared with those of SOEs. 
 
•  Woo et al. (1994) calculated TFP growth rates for a sample of 200 TVEs between 1985 and 
1988. They found that TVEs showed an annual average growth of 8-10 per cent under different 





































1980  12.1 100.0  14.3  12.1  849.4 
1985  31.2 101.8  17.1  30.6  1795.8 
1986  37.5 110.7  17.8  33.9  1903.1 
1987  47.8 114.9  18.3  41.6  2276.7 
1988  65.9 123.9  18.5  53.2  2873.7 
1989  78.6 142.5  18.5  55.1  2988.8 
1990  85.2 169.0  18.8  50.4  2688.3 
1991  87.8 176.0  19.0  49.9  2629.3 
1992  121.4 186.9  18.6  64.9  3487.0 
1993  164.6 199.6  16.9  82.5  4875.0 
1994  264.7 247.5  16.1  107.0  6664.0 
1995  336.2 295.8  15.0  113.7  7562.7 
1996  392.3 339.8  14.3  115.5  8079.5 
1997  433.5 349.7  13.3  124.0  9341.0 
1998  457.3 348.6  8.0  131.2  16356.8 
1999  446.1 334.3  6.7  133.4  19826.8 
1980-1999 
Average Annual 
Growth rate (%) 
20.9  6.6  -3.9     13.5  18.0 
1980-1997 
Average Annual 
Growth rate (%) 
23.4 7.6  -0.4  14.7  15.1 
1997-1999 
Average Annual 
Growth rate (%) 
1.4 -2.2  -28.8  3.8  45.7 
Source:  1. Columns (1) and (3) are from the Statistical Yearbook of China 1996, Table 4-11, Table 12-3, Table 13-2; Statistical
Yearbook 1998, Table 13-3; Statistical Yearbook 2000, Table 13-2, Table 13-3 
                  2. Columns (4) and (5) are calculated by the author. 
  Note:   The deflator used in this table is the same as that in Table 1-6.  
   
1.3.2.2 Factors behind TVE productivity growth  
 
The prosperity of TVEs contributed much to China’s industrial development. This kind of 
enterprise has no counterpart in any other developing country. The success of reform on TVEs can 
be attributed to many distinctly Chinese factors. First, Chinese TVEs are small, flexible and market 
driven. They have to rely on markets for sourcing supplies and selling products. TVEs are usually 
located in rural areas where there is a shortage of goods or where output is needed as a supplement 
to the production of SOEs. Market forces not only influence the production decisions made by 




Second, TVEs have access to cheap labour because of their location in rural areas, but they 
usually face expensive capital due to a strong tendency on the part of banks to grant loans to SOEs. 
This, in some degree, forced TVEs to choose appropriate production technologies. In this sense, 
labour and capital inputs of TVEs should be more productive compared to those of SOEs.   
 
In addition, many TVEs put special emphasis on human capital investment and innovations. 
With their autonomous and flexible system, TVEs recruit highly competent engineers and 
technicians by paying attractive wages and providing a better research environment. TVEs also 
sign contracts directly with research institutions for advice on technological improvements. 
According to a survey in 1999, nearly 50 per cent of TVE total investment was for technological 
development.
8  
      
1.3.3  Productivity performance of foreign funded enterprises 
 
1.3.3.1  The uncertain productivity performance of domestic private owned industrial 
enterprises 
 
“Private” has been a sensitive term in the Chinese economic system for a long time. Controlled 
under socialist ideology, people regarded everything that was private as being against socialism. 
Thus at the beginning of the reform period, private enterprises were not allowed to enter most 
industries, including infrastructure and large-scale manufacturing. But later on, when the 
market-based economic system gradually came into being, private-owned enterprises began to be 
accepted as one of the important components in the whole economy and they performed an 
increasingly important role.   
 
However, because of lack of statistics on private enterprises, it is not easy to statistically 
ascertain whether the rapid development of private industrial firms is a result of productivity 
growth or employment growth. On one side, domestic private enterprises have almost total 
management autonomy. They can employ as few workers as possible to pursue the highest profits 
and resource allocation can thus be more efficient compared to SOEs or COEs. But few research 
studies have successfully shown how their strong autonomy has led to higher productivity.  
 
There is some supportive evidence from examining the productivity growth of collective firms. 
Because of ideological pressures, many private firms did not indicate that they were privately 
owned. Instead, they sought local authorities as a co-owner although they still made management 
decisions. By doing so, these firms could obtain certain advantages such as bank loans and credits 
from the authorities. Statistics from the Development Research Centre of the State Council
9 show 
                                                        
8 Although TVEs mainly produce industrial goods, statistics on TVEs are gathered by the TVE Bureau of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. These data are from http://www.cte.gov.cn/index/asp/xqxw.asp?idd=328. 
9 These statistics can be found at http://www.drcnet.com.cn/NEW_fulltextindex/s1.asp.  
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that 87 per cent of the collective firms before 1995 were in fact private owned, and these firms 
accounted nearly 27 per cent of COE output. This is not a good phenomenon since it would suggest 
an upward bias of productivity growth in the collective sector. But this can reflect that higher 
productivity in private industrial enterprises is very possible. 
 
On the other side, unlike state enterprises and collective firms, domestic private enterprises are 
usually small, engaging mostly in manufacturing production that needs little skills. Management of 
many private firms is decided by family owners.  Consequently, employees have to abide by the 
family rules instead of formal regulation. In addition, private firms have a strong tendency to make 
full use of the talents of their staff and provide few training and retraining opportunities. Despite 
their uncertain productivity performance, private industrial enterprises have always been praised 
for facilitating reform by absorbing extra labour.  
 
1.3.3.2    Foreign funded enterprises 
 
Foreign capital was more welcomed than domestic private capital at the beginning of the 
reform period. Foreign capital flows mainly to the industrial sector, especially manufacturing. Thus 
foreign funded enterprises injected great energy into the Chinese economy. In 1990, they accounted 
for only 1.9 per cent of the total industrial output, but by 1999, their share had increased to 14.4 per 
cent.
10     
 
There are different ways for foreign capital to be invested in China, including joint-ventures,
11 
cooperation
12 and sole investment. Between 1979 and 1985, cooperation was the most popular 
form. But after 1985, joint-venture firms began to increase and the number of cooperation firms 
shrank. At the same time, sole investment firms found more and more development opportunities 
as restrictions on sole investment were relaxed step by step.   
 
Foreign funded firms brought capital, advanced technology and advanced management skills 
to China, which are all believed to have direct or indirect positive effects on productivity. Liu et al. 
(2001), using 41 sub-sector levels of data for the Chinese electronics industry for 1996 and 1997, 
found that the industry significantly benefited in terms of labour productivity from the 
                                                        
10 Again, these statistics can be found at http://www.drcnet.com.cn/NEW_fulltextindex/s1.asp. 
11 Joint Venture Enterprises are ones in which overseas companies, enterprises and financial entities or individuals join hands with 
their Chinese counterparts to invest, administrate, benefit and shoulder risks of their joint holdings with limited responsibilities. 
All investing parties must put in their share of money in accordance with a certain percentage of the total registered capital and 
hence benefit from revenue and dividends or shoulder risks and losses.  
12 Cooperative enterprises are ones in which overseas enterprises, financial entities or individuals join hands with their Chinese 
counterparts to cooperate under contracts in enterprises inside China. Contract conditions and terms will be the gauge via which to 
function, distribute dividends, shoulder risks and losses, pay debts, reclaim investments and redistribute leftover properties while 
terminating cooperation by each cooperative party. Even though it does convert its investment or cooperation condition into shares 
and rights, the conversion will not be considered at all or only considered to limited extent when distributing dividends, 
shouldering losses, paying debts and redistributing leftover properties while terminating cooperation. Administration and 
reclamation of investment can be conducted in a different way from that of joint venture enterprises. This offers the cooperative 




demonstration and competitive effects exerted by foreign firms.   
 
Between 1987 and 2000, about 60 per cent of foreign firms’ investment in China was for 
machinery imports. In terms of transferred technology, nearly 34 per cent was advanced and 66 per 
cent was fairly mature. An increasing number of multinational companies set up new R&D centers 
in recent years.  
 
China’s WTO entry in 2001 encouraged more foreigners to make investments outside of 
manufacturing industries. The Chinese government has approved new regulations in order to 
cooperate with foreign investors in industries such as agricultural technology, transportation and 
energy. Other service industries such as banking, telecommunications, insurance and tourism will 
also gradually become open to foreign investment. In 2002, the Chinese government also permitted 
foreigners to take part in key SOEs, that is, foreign investors now can be shareholders of SOEs. All 
in all, the foreign presence and involvement in recent years has exerted a positive impact on 
China’s economic growth. In the future, a combination of a favourable investment environment 
and policies will provide more opportunities for foreign enterprises. In turn, China will also benefit 
from an investment boom from the foreign capital investment.    
 
1.3.4  A brief comparison of labour productivity . . . 
 
1.3.4.1     . . . between the agricultural sector and the industrial sector  
    
Agricultural labour productivity is much lower than industrial labour productivity (Table 1-11) 
with the latter 5 to 6 times the former during the reform years. This indicates the dual economic 
structure that dominated the Chinese economy until recently.  
 
1.3.4.2     . . . and across different types of industrial enterprises 
 
Table 1-12 provides us with a clear trend of labour productivity changes in different types of 
industrial enterprises. Labour productivity in SOEs was lowest in 1980, but up to 1998, labour 
productivity in the other-type enterprises group outperformed both SOEs and COEs. SOEs’ labour 
productivity surged after 1998 due to the implementation of laid-off policy mentioned earlier. This 
policy also had an effect on COEs, where employment fell from 13.3 million to 8.0 million in 1998 










Table 1-11: Labour Productivity Comparison Between Primary 









1980  466.8 2652.5 
1981  490.2 2830.0 
1982  527.7 2798.7 
1983  557.4 2841.1 
1984  633.3 3036.8 
1985  640.2 3181.1 
1986  651.7 3364.9 
1987  665.8 3487.2 
1988  635.5 3613.5 
1989  591.9 3803.1 
1990  615.7 3595.0 
1991  659.2 3165.0 
1992  706.4 3475.2 
1993  759.1 4083.4 
1994  767.0 4435.6 
1995  836.4 4940.1 
1996  945.4 5364.3 
1997  1015.7 5932.4 
1998  1119.6 6452.3 
1999  1247.2 6958.6 
2000  1298.0 7569.2 
2001   8259.1 
1980-2000 








Average Annual Growth Rate 
(%) 
8.5 8.5 
Source: 1. Column (1) is from Table 1-4 
             2. Column (2) is calculated from the Statistical Yearbook of China 2002, Table 3-1, 
Table 5-2  











Table 1-12: Labour Productivity Comparison for Industrial 
















1980  1174.6  849.4  N/A 
1985  1622.7  1795.8 7885.1 
1986  1592.2  1903.1 9475.1 
1987  1757.3  2276.7 11924.9 
1988  1975.5  2873.7 13128.2 
1989  2027.1  2988.8 11585.3 
1990  1771.4  2688.3 10020.6 
1991  1900.1  2629. 3  9062.7 
1992  2109.4  3487.0 10431.1 
1993  2531.2  4875.0 10586.5 
1994  2423.0  6664.0 11669.8 
1995  2400.4  7562.7 12880.8 
1996  2488.4  8079.5 12658.5 
1997  2545.9  9341.0 13930.2 
1998  3544.5  16356.8 11111.1 
1999  4411.5  19826.8 12448.6 
2000  5929.6     
2001 6932.0     
Source: 1. Columns (1) and (2) are from Table 1-6 and Table 1-10 
             2.Column (3) is calculated from the Statistical Yearbook of China 1996 & 2000 Table 13-2, Table 13-3 and 
the Statistical Yearbook of China 2000, Table 1-17 
Note:  1. All values are in 1980 constant prices.  







PART TWO: UNDERSTANDING CHINESE POVERTY  
 
2.1 Poverty and its Distribution in China 
 
2.1.1  National poverty 
 
Since the adoption of economic reform, the Chinese Government has made notable 
achievements in poverty relief. Sala-i-Martin (2002) applied the World Bank poverty lines, i.e. 
$1/day and $2/day, to trace Chinese poverty from the 1970s to the late 1990s, and found that 
poverty in China decreased dramatically through time (Table 2-1). 
 
        Table 2-1:  Chinese Poverty Statistics   
 
        Poverty rate (%)      Number of poor (million) 
Year  1970  1980  1990  1998  1970  1980  1990  1998 
$1/day  27  20  10  3  218.3  194.8  109.5  32.4 
              
$2/day  74  56  36  19  608.7  554.1  405.0  231.8 
Source: Sala-i-Martin, NBER Working paper 8933, May 2002 
 
2.1.2 Rural poverty  
 
Poverty in China has always been regarded as a rural problem. In China, the rural population 
accounts for a very large part of the total population. In 1978, the rural population share was 82.1 
per cent. By 2001 it declined to 62.3 per cent (Table 2-2).
13 It is interesting to note that all the 
population growth in China since 1978 has been accounted for by the urban population. The size of 
the rural population was virtually the same in 2001 as in 1978 (790 –796 million), while the urban 
population nearly tripled from 172 million to 481 million. 
 
China is widely recognized for its achievement in reducing rural poverty since the adoption of 
a broad program of rural economic reforms beginning in 1978. The sustained dramatic reduction of 
rural poverty over the last two decades of reform is exemplary by any standard. 
                                                        
13 In fact, three definitions of the rural and urban division have been used in China. The first one is by an administrative system 
whereby urban population refers to the total population under the jurisdiction of cities and the population of towns under the 
jurisdiction of counties; while rural population refers to the total population of townships under the jurisdiction of counties. The 
second definition is based on permanent residence whereby urban refers to the total population of districts under the jurisdiction of 
a city without district establishment, the population of resident-committees of towns under the jurisdiction of a city without district 
establishment, and the resident-committees of towns under the jurisdiction of a county; while rural refers to the total population 
excluding the urban population. The most recent definition classifies urban and rural according to the Regulation of Statistics 
Classification on Urban and Rural Population, formulated by the National Bureau of Statistics in 1999. Before 1982, population 
statistics were based on the first definition. From 1982 to 1999, the second definition was widely used. Since 2000, the population 
census began using the Regulation of Statistics Classification on Urban and Rural Population, formulated by the National Bureau of 





Table 2-2:  Basic Statistics on the Urban/Rural Split in the Chinese Population, 
1978-2001 
     (in millions of persons) 
 
Year  Total Pop.  Urban Pop.    urban/total (%)  Rural Pop.   rural/total (%) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1978  962.59 172.45  17.92  790.14  82.08 
1980  987.05 191.40  19.39  795.65  80.61 
1985  1058.51 250.94  23.71  807.57  76.29 
1986  1075.07 263.66  24.52  811.41  75.48 
1987  1093.00 276.74  25.32  816.26  74.68 
1988  1110.26 286.61  25.81  823.65  74.19 
1989  1127.04 295.40  26.21  831.64  73.79 
1990  1143.33 301.95  26.41  841.38  73.59 
1991  1158.23 312.03  26.94  846.20  73.06 
1992  1171.71 321.75  27.46  849.96  72.54 
1993  1185.17 331.73  27.99  853.44  72.01 
1994  1198.50 341.69  28.51  856.81  71.49 
1995  1211.21 351.74  29.04  859.47  70.96 
1996  1223.89 373.04  30.48  850.85  69.52 
1997  1236.26 394.49  31.91  841.77  68.09 
1998  1247.61 416.08  33.35  831.53  66.65 
1999  1257.86 437.48  34.78  820.38  65.22 
2000  1267.43 459.06  36.22  808.73  63.81 
2001  1276.27 480.64  37.66  795.63  62.34 
1978-2001 
Average annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
1.2 4.6  3.3  0.7 -1.2 
Source:  Statistical Yearbook of China, 1999 and 2002, Table 4-1     
    Note:    Data after 1990 were adjusted according to the national population census. So once there is 
inconsistence data from previous years, we follow the latest one. 
 
Based on the official rural poverty lines
14 30.7 per cent of the rural population was poor in 1978. 





                                                        
14 The poverty line is set as an expenditure level that is necessary to meet both the minimum nutritional requirement of 2100 
calories/day and the minimum non-food expenditure requirement. After 1995, the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
began using a food expenditure regression model to calculate the weight of non-food expenditure, instead of applying a fixed 
weight of 0.4 for non-food expenditure. In reality, the NBS also takes into consideration other factors, such as regional expenditure 





            Table 2-3:  Official Rural Poverty Statistics 
 
Year  Individual Annual  
Poverty line  Poverty incidence    Number 
  (yuan in current prices)  (%)  (millions) 
1978  100 30.7  250.0 
1984  200 15.1  128.0 
1985  206 14.8  125.0 
1986  213 15.5  131.0 
1987  227 14.3  122.0 
1988  236 11.1  96.0 
1989  259 11.6  102.0 
1990  300 9.6  85.0 
1992  317 8.8  80.0 
1994  440 7.7  70.0 
1995  530 7.1  65.4 
1997  640 5.4  49.6 
1998  635 4.6  42.1 
1999  625 3.7  34.1 
2000  625 3.4  32.1 
2001  635 3.2  29.0 
   Source: Chinese rural poverty between 1978-2001, NBS  
        
China’s rural poverty did not experience a steady decline over time. The most impressive 
decline happened in the first half of the 1980s (Chart 2-1) – from 1978 to 1984, the rural poverty 
rate dropped more than 15 points, declining at a slower rate after that.  
             
The official poverty lines are criticized for being too low. For example, in 1998 the poverty 
line set by the Chinese government was 635 yuan per year or 1.74 yuan per day. If we take the 
official exchange rate as a proxy for PPP, that is PPP=8,
15 this makes the official poverty line only 
about 0.22$U.S. per day. Even using the Penn World Table PPP estimate of 4, 1.74 yuan per day is 
equivalent to a poverty line of 0.44$U.S. per day, still far below the lower international standard 
poverty line set for developing countries of 1$U.S. per day.
16 In this sense, the poverty incidence in 
rural China should be much larger than those official statistics. As shown in Table 2-4, the World 
Bank has estimated the incidence of rural poverty at 11.5 per cent in 1998, more than double the 
official estimate of 4.6 per cent.  Note, however, that no matter which estimates we take, there is 
strong evidence of a downward trend in rural poverty. 
                                                        
15 In 1998, the average exchange rate was 1$U.S.=8.2791YUAN, but PPP could not be that high. It is usually thought to be around 4 
yuan per dollar. 
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1978  33.0    
1984  11.0    
1985  11.9    
1986  11.9    
1987  11.1    
1988  10.4    
1989  12.3    
1990  11.5  31.3  42.8 
1991    31.7  40.8 
1992    30.1  40.9 
1993    29.1  40.8 
1994    25.9  34.9 
1995    21.8  31.0 
1996    15.0  24.3 
1997    13.5  24.2 
1998    11.5   




2.1.3  Emergence of urban poverty 
 
Unlike rural poverty, urban poverty did not attract much attention in the 1980s. At that time, 
only a very small number of urban residents were considered to be living under the poverty line. 
They were broken down into three groups of “have-nots”, i.e. those having no income resources, 
those having no ability to work and those having no legal guardian. The ratio of the urban poor to 
the rural poor population in 1980 was less than 1 to 50. After the mid-1980s and especially entering 
the 1990s, the urban poor group began to include more people who were employable and wanted to 
work but could not find jobs.   
 
Because the Government of China has never published official estimates of the urban poor 
population, some scholars and government agencies have used their own methods to estimate the 
scale of urban poverty.
17 These estimates vary, roughly between 15 million urban poor and 31 
million urban poor, with some suggesting that another 5 to 6 million should be added to include 
people working in nearly bankrupt firms or working part-time. 
 
In recent years, the National Bureau of Statistics has begun to follow a new method based on 
the work of Martin Ravallion
18 to calculate urban poverty, although the simple base-year 
adjustment model
19 is still used most often. The available estimates by using both methods are 
listed in Table 2-5:    
 
Table 2-5: NBS Estimations of Urban Poverty 
 
Ravallion method  Base-year Adjustment Method 








1995   19.1  5.4  12.4  3.5 
1998 1480  14.8  3.5     
1999 1860  13.8  3.1     
2000 1875  11.7  2.5  10.5  2.3 
   Source: National Bureau of Statistics 
All of the above statistics have convinced us that urban poverty increased significantly in recent 
years since the beginning of economic reform. The Chinese government realized that urban 
poverty was a severe problem that could impact on further reform or even cause political instability, 
and instituted measures to reduce urban poverty.
20 Between 1995 and 2000 the urban poor 
population decreased.   
 
                                                        
17 See http://www.macrochina.com.cn/gov/hgyx/20010426002903.shtml for details. 
18 See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/index.htm for details. 
19 The base-year adjustment method considers 3-5 years as a cycle and treats the first year as the base. Once a poverty line is set for 
the base year, other poverty lines in the following years within this cycle will be adjusted by the price index. This method is very 
simple in application, but its automatic assumption of a uniform price index across cities is obviously unrealistic.  
20 See Appendix 3 for a discussion of the social security system in China, which has contributed through unemployment insurance  
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2.2  Productivity growth and income inequality 
 
Two decades of economic reform has lead to higher productivity in all of the economic sectors 
that we have data for and as a result people have gradually earned higher incomes. But the higher 
incomes are not equally distributed. In addition to inequality between rural and urban areas, in 
recent years, gaps have developed within the same urban city and across regions. Additionally, a 
more general concept of inequality would include inequality of access to opportunities for 
education, medical care, social insurance, etc. The inequality phenomenon in China needs to be 
explored beyond the context of economic growth.       
 
2.2.1  Higher incomes but lower equality     
 
2.2.1.1  Income growth in rural and urban China 
 
Higher incomes in both rural and urban areas have lifted many poor people out of poverty and 
most Chinese people now live a much better life than ever before. For rural Chinese, the average 
annual net income was just 133.6 yuan in 1978 (Table 2-6). By 1989, it exceeded 600 yuan for the 
first time. Rural residents’ net income increased to 2090.1 yuan by 1997 and to 2366.4 yuan by 
2001. Based on 1978 constant prices, the average annual rate of increase in real incomes between 
1978 and 2001 was 7.3 per cent, with a rate of increase of 15.2 per cent per year between 1978 and 
1985.  
 
For urban residents, real income increased at an average annual rate of 6.4 per cent per year, a 
little lower than growth in rural incomes. But urban average annual disposable incomes were at 
much higher levels (Table 2-7). 
 
2.2.1.2   Evidence of income inequality 
 
(A)   Rural-urban income inequality  
 
Despite the continuous income growth in both rural and urban China, there is a big income gap 
between urban residents and rural residents (see Chart 2-2). And although the gap tended to shrink 
in the early 1980s, it later on turned to expansion with the rural population becoming relatively 
poorer but the urban population relatively richer.  
 
Moreover, income of peasants in rural areas does not only include money income, but also 
includes income in form of goods. Only about 60 per cent of rural income is in fact money income. 
When the necessary expenditures for seeds, fertilizers, oil and other materials for production in the 
following year are taken into account, rural disposable income is even lower. In addition, urban 
residents can receive non-pecuniary benefits such as housing, education and health care which are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and a minimum living standard allowance to reducing the urban poor.  
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not included in income. Both these two effects suggest that the gap between rural and urban 
incomes is underestimated. 
 
 
Table 2-6:  Average Annual Net Income per capita











(1978 constant prices) 
(3) 
1978  133.6 100.0  133.6 
1980  191.3 139.0  185.7 
1985  397.6 268.9  359.3 
1986  423.8 277.6  370.9 
1987  462.6 292.0  390.1 
1988  544.9 310.7  415.1 
1989  601.5 305.7  408.4 
1990  686.3 311.2  415.8 
1991  708.6 317.4  424.0 
1992  784.0 336.2  449.2 
1993  921.6 346.9  463.5 
1994  1221.0 364.4  486.8 
1995  1577.7 383.7  512.6 
1996  1926.1 418.2  558.7 
1997  2090.1 437.4  584.4 
1998  2162.0 456.2  609.5 
1999  2210.3 473.5  632.6 
2000  2253.4 483.5  646.0 
2001  2366.4 503.8  673.1 
1978-2001 
Average annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
13.3 7.3  7.3 
1978-1997 
Average annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
15.6 8.1  8.  1 
1997-2001 
Average annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
3.2 3.6  3.6 
Source:  1. Columns (1) and (2) are from the Statistical Yearbook of China 2002, Table 10-3 
                    2. Column (3) is calculated by multiplying the real income index by the base year income value. 
                                                        
21 Rural net income refers to the total income of permanent residents of rural households during a year, after deducting of expenses 
for productive and non-productive business operation, payment of taxes and payment for collective units for their contracted tasks. 
Income can then be used for investments in productive and non-productive construction, for consumption in daily life and for 
savings deposits. It is an indicator that shows the actual level of the income of the rural household. The rural net income also 
includes the income from non-business operation, such as the money remitted or brought back by the members of the household 




   
Table 2-7: Average Annual Disposable Income per capita





Nominal Income  
(current prices) 
(1) 




(1978 constant price) 
(3) 
1978  343.4 100.0  343.4 
1980  477.6 127.0  436.1 
1985  739.1 160.4  550.8 
1986  899.6 182.5  626.7 
1987  1002.2 186.9  641.8 
1988  1181.4 182.5  626.7 
1989  1375.7 182.8  627.7 
1990  1510.2 198.1  680.3 
1991  1700.6 212.4  729.4 
1992  2026.6 232.9  799.8 
1993  2577.4 255.1  876.0 
1994  3496.2 276.8  950.5 
1995  4283.0 290.3  996.9 
1996  4838.9 301.6  1035.7 
1997  5160.3 311.9  1071.1 
1998  5425.1 329.9  1132.9 
1999  5854.0 360.6  1238.3 
2000  6280.0 383.7  1317.6 
2001  6859.6  416.3 1429.6 
1978-2001 
Average annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
13.9 6.4  6.4 
1978-1997 
Average annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
15.3 6.2  6.2 
1997-2001 
Average annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
7.4 7.5  7.5 
Source: 1. Columns (1) and (2) are from the Statistical Yearbook of China 2002, Table 10-3 









                                                        
22 Urban disposable income refers to the actual income of the urban households which can be used for daily expenses, i.e. total 
income minus personal income tax, household subsidies and expenditure on household sideline production.  
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           Source: Table 2-6, Table 2-7 
           Note:  Because of lack of data for 1980-1985, we use a linear trend for the intervening years. 
                   
The Gini coefficient is an indicator of income inequality. In China, the national Gini coefficient 
actually fell from 0.33 in 1980 to 0.28 in 1991, but has steadily increased since then. The Gini 
coefficient exceeded the “warning line” of 0.4 in 1996, as stressed by the Government of China. 
Since 1996, the coefficient has still shown no signs of declining (Table 2-8). 
 
Meanwhile, we observe that if rural and urban are treated as separate categories, neither of 
them manifests inequality as severe as the nation as a whole. In this sense, China’s income 
inequality is mainly one of rural-urban inequality.  
 
(B) Inequality within rural and urban areas  
 
Even though rural and urban Gini coefficients were still below the official warning line of 0.4 
by 2000, there is an increasing trend toward inequality within rural and urban areas. These trends 
are worth investigating because of the potential of the current situation developing into a critical 
problem over time. Looking at the rural situation, we see that the Gini coefficient in 1978 was fairly 
low, at 0.212, but it has increased continuously over time and by 2000, it had jumped up to 0.354. In 
urban areas, there has also been a significant upward shift from a very low level of 0.16 in 1978 to 
0.32 in 2000. If current trends continue, the Gini coefficients related to urban and rural areas could 






       Table 2-8 :  Gini coefficients in China, 1978-2000 
Year  National  Rural  Urban 
1978   0.212 0.16 
1980  0.33 0.241  0.16 
1981   0.241 0.15 
1982   0.232 0.15 
1983   0.246 0.15 
1984   0.244 0.16 
1985   0.227 0.19 
1986   0.304 0.19 
1987   0.305 0.20 
1991  0.282 0.303  0.24 
1992   0.313 0.25 
1993   0.329 0.27 
1994   0.321 0.30 
1995  0.388 0.342  0.28 
1996  0.424 0.323  0.28 
1997   0.329 0.29 
1998  0.456 0.337  0.30 
1999  0.457 0.336  0.295 
2000  0.458 0.354  0.32 
     Source: National Bureau of Statistics 
  
(C) Regional inequality  
 
Regional inequality in China has become pronounced along with rural/urban inequality, 
especially after 1992 when Chinese economic reform accelerated. China has 23 provinces, five 
autonomous regions and four centrally controlled municipalities. A useful way to investigate the 
regional inequality is to divide these regions into several compound parts. Instead of following the 
standard coastal-central-western division, we follow the official geographical division:   
 
•  the South-west region, including Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou and Yunan; 
•  the North-west region, including Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang; 
•  the Middle region, including Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Guangdong;  
•  the South-east region, including Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian,    Jiangxi and 
Shandong;  
•  the North-east region, including Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang; and 
•  the North region, including Beijing,Tianjin, Hebei and inner Mongolia.  
 
It can be seen in Table 2-9 that GDP per capita in each region has increased since 1978. For 
example, in 1978, GDP per capita in the South-east region was 403.9 billion yuan and it reached  
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3303.8 billion yuan in 2001; while for the South-west region, GDP per capita increased from 223.4 
billion yuan in 1978 to 1409.1 billion yuan in 2001. But levels of GDP per capita across regions 
actually differ a lot. Western regions are much poorer than eastern regions.  
 
Taking the national GDP per capita as the base, the regional GDP per capita can be transferred 
into indexes that are relative to the base value, as shown in Table 2-10. Clearly GDP per capita in 
Central and Western regions has never reached the national level while that in the other three 
regions, i.e. North, Northeast and Southeast, has been above the national level.  
 
GDP per capita growth rates seem to be very close across region, but have been slightly lower 
in western regions. With their much lower levels of GDP per capita, a slight difference in growth 
results in a growing gap between regions. 
 
2.2.2   Economic growth and the evolution of inequality 
 
Income equality in China not only exists between rural and urban areas but also within rural 
areas, within urban areas and across regions. The growth in income inequality is an outcome of 
economic growth during reform.  
 
China is a country with an apparent dual economic structure, i.e. the modern industrial sector 
and the traditional agricultural sector, which co-exist and co-develop. The Chinese industrial sector 
is usually capital intensive, large-scale and with most industrial enterprises located in urban areas, 
while the agricultural sector is more labour intensive and by nature mainly rural. Thus the income 
levels of rural and urban residents were different before reform.  
 
When reform started, successful implementation of HRS together with higher procurement 
prices greatly increased farmers’ productivity in the agricultural sector. Farmers benefited from 
higher output that was a crucial basis for income increases. But for the first few years, there was 
actually no commensurate reform in other sectors. Therefore increasing rural income simply 
demonstrated a catch-up trend. 
 
In the late 1980s as reform efforts expanded, not only did rural-urban income inequality 
gradually expand, but also income differences between rural families appeared. For some, income 
increases from agricultural production slowed down since HRS only improved productivity by 
raising farmers’ incentives for a short period of time. For others, development of rural industry 
(TVEs), did help rural non-agricultural workers achieve higher incomes. From 1984 on, the 
emphasis of Chinese economic reform began shifting from rural areas to urban areas. The natural 
advantages of the existence of a large industrial sector together with the government’s strong 
support greatly encouraged urban economic growth. And in terms of income increases, urban 






















1978  360.3  223.4  323.2 285.9  560.3 477.6  403.9 
1979  391.8  255.5  342.3 320.1  574.5 512.9  439.3 
1980  415.7  267.5  350.9 346.0  627.8 531.3  464.7 
1981  437.2  275.3  353.9 372.8  634.7 533.8  504.9 
1982  480.2  316.0  381.4 409.0  683.6 591.6  551.4 
1983  527.2  339.4  430.1 447.2  777.0 651.7  599.9 
1984  592.7  382.9  473.1 496.4  866.0 735.4  683.3 
1985  643.6  411.0  516.9 545.3  901.1 780.9  757.6 
1986  680.4  420.8  558.8 581.7  981.6 806.7  800.3 
1987  758.3  470.4 604.1  659.5  1101.9 870.8 894.6 
1988  839.2  524.8 670.4  737.2  1189.7 952.2 994.9 
1989  859.7 529.2  686.0  771.7  1212.8  977.5 1009.2 
1990  888.4 576.7  725.3  809.2  1227.5  987.8 1027.0 
1991  941.9 600.2  774.4  862.5  1286.3  1041.2 1097.0 
1992  1057.6 641.2  828.9  980.7  1426.2  1142.2  1265.3 
1993  1221.4 746.6  875.8  1135.3  1621.5  1327.8 1480.9 
1994  1341.0 805.1  910.3  1243.8  1724.7  1401.3 1688.0 
1995  1488.0 878.0  970.3  1399.1  1776.1  1573.1  1911.7 
1996  1643.7  972.4 1060.4 1544.2  1933.2 1757.7  2117.1 
1997  1819.9 1068.5  1160.0  1704.9  2138.7  1956.9  2354.0 
1998  1994.0  1166.7  1266.0 1859.0  2334.4 2160.4  2590.2 
1999  2135.6  1231.3  1367.3 1979.9  2485.6 2301.8  2797.7 
2000  2330.7  1320.2  1497.7 2161.8  2729.8 2531.2  3050.8 
2001  2525.8  1409.1  1628.1 2343.6  2974.0 2760.7  3303.8 
1978-2001 
Average annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
8.9  8.3  7.3 9.6  7.5 7.9  9.6 
1978-1997 
Average annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
8.9  7.6  7.0 9.9  7.3 7.7  9.7 
1997-2001 
Average annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
8.5  7.2  8.8 8.3  8.6 9.0  8.  8 
Sources: 1. Liu (2000)  
              2. The Statistical Yearbook of China 2002, Table 3-8, Table 4-3 
Note:      1. We did not include the GDP of Hainan in the South-east region, nor the GDP of Tibet into the South-west region, so the  
                   national GDP per capita is slightly different than that in Table 1-1.  


























1978  1.33  1.56  1.12  0.79  0.62  0.90 
1979  1.31  1.47  1.12  0.82  0.65  0.87 
1980  1.28  1.51  1.12  0.83  0.64  0.84 
1981  1.22  1.45  1.15  0.85  0.63  0.81 
1982  1.23  1.42  1.15  0.85  0.66  0.79 
1983  1.24  1.47  1.14  0.85  0.64  0.82 
1984  1.24  1.46  1.15  0.84  0.65  0.80 
1985  1.21  1.40  1.18  0.85  0.64  0.80 
1986  1.19  1.44  1.18  0.85  0.62  0.82 
1987  1.15  1.45  1.18  0.87  0.62  0.80 
1988  1.13  1.42  1.19  0.88  0.63  0.80 
1989  1.14  1.41  1.17  0.90  0.62  0.80 
1990  1.11  1.38  1.16  0.91  0.65  0.82 
1991  1.11  1.37  1.16  0.92  0.64  0.82 
1992  1.08  1.35  1.20  0.93  0.61  0.78 
1993  1.09  1.33  1.21  0.93  0.61  0.72 
1994  1.04  1.29  1.26  0.93  0.60  0.68 
1995  1.06  1.19  1.28  0.94  0.59  0.65 
1996  1.07  1.18  1.29  0.94  0.59  0.65 
1997  1.08  1.18  1.29  0.94  0.59  0.64 
1998  1.08  1.17  1.30  0.93  0.59  0.63 
1999  1.08  1.16  1.31  0.93  0.58  0.64 
2001  1.09  1.18  1.31  0.93  0.56  0.64 
Source: Table 2-9 
  
By the 1990s, growing income inequality was exhibited in a number of dimensions, that is, 
rural-urban inequality, within rural inequality and within urban inequality. Throughout the whole 
decade, firms employed less labour as pursuing growth depended on increasing productivity rather 
than increasing labour input. And both the urban industrial sector and TVEs demonstrated strong 
trends to substitute capital for labour. China is famous for its huge labour endowment. Thus 
although higher productivity resulted in income increases of those who stayed employed, the 
increases were at the expense of those who lost the opportunity to work.  
 
Benefits from rapid economic growth have not been spread across the regions because 
preferential regional policies have been adopted. For example, for a long time the open-door policy 
was only applied to coastal cities and all were located in eastern areas. Those open-door regions 
accumulated capital resources more easily and quickly compared to other regions. In addition, the 




2.3   Evidence of the relationship between productivity, poverty and income inequality in 
the 1990s 
 
This section provides some empirical evidence of the relationship between labour productivity, 
poverty and income inequality in the 1990s. We treat poverty rates (both 1$U.S./day and 
2$U.S./day) as dependent variables and labour productivity and income inequality as explanatory 
variables to obtain estimates on how labour productivity and income inequality affect poverty.  See 
CSLS (2003) for a discussion of this method as applied to a large sample of developing countries, 
and for a broad review of the effect of productivity growth, output growth and growth in GDP per 
capita on reducing poverty as well as the effect income inequality has on this relationship. 
 
The poverty indicators and Gini coefficients in the following estimations come from the World 
Bank
23 and the labour productivity data are from Chinese Statistical Yearbook data.
24 It should be 
noted here that both the dependent and explanatory variables are based on the Chinese household 
survey data of relevant years (1990-1998). Thus while our method uses inconsistent resource data 
it is not ad hoc. 
 
We use OLS estimation and apply different specifications in investigating the relationships 
between poverty and labour productivity and income inequality in level terms (Table 2-11). 
 
Specifications (1) and (3) in each regression have coefficients of total economy labour 
productivity with negative signs that are statistically significant no matter if we control for 
inequality or not. This indicates that productivity improvement has had a strong influence in 
reducing Chinese poverty. 
 
Different industries have differing effects on poverty. From specifications (2) and (4), we find 
that industrial labour productivity improvement had a significant influence in poverty reduction 
while this was not the case for agricultural labour productivity. Surprisingly, the coefficient of 
agricultural labour productivity shows a positive sign, which might indicate that higher agricultural 
labour productivity does not result in lower poverty rates, and may make the poverty situation 
worse. But all the coefficients for agricultural productivity in different specifications are 
statistically insignificant.   
 
The positive relationship between agricultural labour productivity and poverty in the 1990s 
might reflect a terms of trade effect. Agricultural prices when compared with urban industrial 
prices are unreasonably low so that rural people cannot obtain a corresponding benefit from 
productivity increases. 
                                                        
23 Data can be found in the world Bank Poverty Monitoring website: 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor/countrydetails/China.htm 
24 These productivity data can be found in Part One.  
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Table 2-11: Estimation Results from the Regression of Poverty on Productivity 
and Income Inequality (Poverty line= $1/day) 
 
 Specifications 









































R-square  0.6663 0.9694 0.7348 0.9737 
DW-Statistic  1.34618 1.86133 1.47335 2.16694 
Note: ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant level, respectively.    
 
    
Table 2-12:  Estimation Results from the Regression of Poverty on Productivity 
and Income Inequality (Poverty line= $2/day) 
 
 Specifications 









































R-square  0.6945 0.9659 0.7176 0.9800 
DW-Statistic 1.5169  1.3908  1.5711  1.9834 







Now if we look at the effect of inequality on poverty, a more surprising finding is that all the 
Gini coefficients are statistically insignificant. That means income inequality in China during the 
1990s, although increasing to near the warning line of a Gini coefficient of 0.4, does not seem to 
significantly affect poverty.  
 
Our variables in both regression models have good explanatory power in our estimation, 
especially for the case with agricultural and industrial productivity, when the R-square values are 
near 1.  
 
  However, there are some statistical problems that need to be mentioned.  First of all, there is 
likely to be reverse causation between poverty and productivity.  Not only does productivity reduce 
poverty through its role in raising living standards, but poverty can also reduce productivity since 
poor families do not have access to skills-improving higher education for example.  Also, using the 
most reliable data available has meant that only a short time period can be covered.  The 
regressions cover only the 1990-1998 period and so are based on only 9 observations, implying that 
the results are quite likely biased.  Finally, other work in the area of growth’s effect on poverty, 
especially Hayes et al. (1994) who focus on productivity growth, has typically included variables to 
control for cyclicality and social policy, and where time series are available have also considered 
some sort of autoregressive process.  Indeed, Hayes et al. (1994) employ vector autoregression to 
examine the bidirectional relationship between changes in productivity and poverty in the United 
States and also include the unemployment rate and tax and transfer indicators as additional 
explanatory variables. 
 
  Given these statistical qualifications, we still have confidence in the general relationship 
between productivity and poverty and the conclusion that productivity increases have played an 
important role in reducing poverty in China.  Productivity reducing poverty is also supported by the 
work of Hayes et al. (1994), and the premise of economic growth in general benefiting the poor has 





PART THREE: SUSTAINABILITY OF PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND POVERTY 
REDUCTION 
 
  Growth in productivity has contributed much to the impressive Chinese economic growth 
since the beginning of reform. However, that economic growth is accompanied by increasing 
inequality. How can China sustain future productivity growth but keep inequality within an 
acceptable range? What future reforms should the Chinese government bring in?    
 
3.1 Factors determining future productivity growth 
 
3.1.1   Technological innovation  
 
In both developing countries and developed countries, scientific and technical advancement 
exerts an important, supporting role in transforming traditional industry and promoting sustainable 
development. 
 
Take agriculture as an example. Chinese agricultural productivity growth in the 1980s was 
mostly stimulated by non-sustainable factors. Although the introduction of the household 
responsibility system and higher prices of agricultural products had a great effect on improving 
agricultural productivity, their effects were rather transitory. It is not reasonable to expect another 
institutional reform like HRS. Nor is it possible to raise prices of agricultural products to a higher 
level in a more open economy since such prices would then not be competitive in the international 
market. 
 
Over the past decade, technological application in agricultural production has led to a strong 
productivity growth trend with more persistent effects. Although China's population has increased 
by several hundred million in that period, the number of people involved in agricultural production 
has not increased accordingly. China’s annual per capita agricultural output has still increased. 
New agricultural varieties introduced every few years have contributed to the productivity 
advance. 
 
Certainly, achievements gained from science and technology are closely related to the Chinese 
government’s general and deliberate development strategy for science and technology. The priority 
given to that area along with the response to the new situation of economic globalization and 
China's entry to the WTO enable China to take part in international economic and technological 
cooperation and competition on a broader scale.  
 
In short, science and technology improvements will continuously serve as a long-term force 
for Chinese economic development through the enhancement of productivity growth.  
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3.1.2 Further structural adjustment  
 
China will need to energetically push forward structural adjustment as an important factor in 
maintaining the sustained, rapid and sound growth of productivity. “China has already reached a 
point where it cannot further develop its economy without making further structural adjustments” 
(Government of China, 2001). Such structural adjustment would allow the Chinese economy to 
better distribute its resources so as to take the maximum advantage of changing patterns of 
technological progress.  
 
Efforts to make structural adjustments in future reform need to be intensified to support the 
technological transformation of the key industries and enterprises. Such adjustments could help 
large industrial enterprises raise their capacity for product development and technological 
innovation. As well enterprises could focus more on quality and variety improvement while 
avoiding expanding only their production capacity. In addition, previous structural adjustments 
were done through government intervention, but future structural adjustment, if left up to market 
forces, could make enterprises more responsive, more competitive and more capable of innovation. 
 
3.1.3 Human resource development as a vital impetus 
 
In the theory of development, use of human resources has been widely accepted as crucial for 
sustainable growth. Human capital contributes to economic growth along with physical capital. 
Romer (1990) found that human capital is the major input to research and development that 
innovates technologies. Countries with a larger human capital stock are more likely to have new 
products and grow faster than other countries. In future years, little room is left for any economy to 
follow a growth path of intensive use of traditional inputs. Instead, human resource development 
that can increase human capital will be a more effective way to sustain growth.  
 
The essential strategy to create and improve human capital is through education. In China, 
where there are incommensurately large human resources, the average level of education is quite 
low. Statistics shows that the Chinese labour force was 870 million in 2000 and this number is 
expected to increase to 1 billion by 2013. However, in 2000 only 18 per cent of working age (25-64) 
Chinese had a senior or higher level education. More than 42 per cent were at the primary or lower 
level (Ministry of Education, 2003). 
Of those who were employed in 2000, 75 per cent had a junior or primary level education, no 
more than 12.7 per cent had a senior or vocational school level education, and only 4.7 per cent had 
received university education.  
The low education level is mainly reflected in a low promotion rate for junior graduates (Table 
3-1). The rate is slightly higher than 50 per cent, even in 2000. This means about half of the junior 
graduates began to work right after graduation or idled at home. In addition, for those who entered 
senior school, the promotion rate to universities prior to 1999 is not high – below 50 per cent except 
for the year 1996 and a surprising surge in 1999 and 2000.   
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Table 3-1: Promotion Rate of Regular School by Level & Type of Graduates 
 
Year 
Promotion Rate of 
Primary School 
Graduates (%) 
Promotion Rate of Junior School 
Graduates (%) 














































Source: Ministry of Education (2000)  
Note: Promotion of junior graduates includes entering senior high schools, vocational schools, technical schools and
specialized secondary schools.  
As well, education in China is uneven across the country. A significant difference exists 
between rural and urban areas with rural residents at a significant disadvantage. For example, in 
2000, total illiteracy (15 years old or above) in China is 87.0 million and three quarters of these are 
in rural areas (Ministry of Education, 2003). In terms of the total number of people who have 
received different levels of education, rural and urban comparisons are 29:1 for university or 
higher level education, 7:1 for senior and 1.92:1 for junior. Low education levels are a big hurdle 
for rural development. How the issue of education in the rural areas is handled will have a direct 
impact on the success or failure of the ongoing rural reform.   
3.2 Government’s role in economic growth  
 
Good governance is essential for an economy that is aiming to create a healthy and equitable 
society. For the Chinese economy, governance is even more critical since China is still in the 
process of economic reform and many complicated problems are difficult to resolve. The most 
stubborn problem China is facing now seems not to be how fast the economic growth will be, but 
rather how to achieve growth in a healthy way. Reform will inevitably have an unbalanced 
influence on different economic groups. One role for the Chinese government is to help those who 
are inherently disadvantaged and those who become disadvantaged because of lack of equal 
opportunity in the process of reform.  
 
3.2.1 Improvement of the basic social security system  
 
China is at the critical stage of reform characterized by a high economic growth rate and high 
inequality. It is now necessary for the Chinese government to improve the present social security 
system so as to keep inequality levels within an acceptable range. Higher growth allows people to 
enjoy a better living standard. But growth with widening inequality means that not only will the 




Previously, Chinese social security was tied to the firm not to the individual. Only if people 
were employed in state firms could they enjoy unemployment insurance, medical care and a 
retirement pension. If they quit, none of these benefits would be provided. Therefore, even those 
who did not feel satisfied working in state firms and had opportunities to be employed in non-state 
firms with higher wages chose to stay until retirement when all the benefits could be realized. 
 
  Since 1995, China has undertaken reform on its social security system and in 2002, a basic 
framework for a social security system was established and successively implemented, covering 
the vast majority of urban workers and retirees (Government of China, 2002). This new system 
consists of social insurance, social relief, social welfare, social mutual help and special care for 
disabled people and family members of revolutionary martyrs, and features the raising of funds 
through various channels instead of depending on enterprises and institutions only. Appendix 3 
discusses the details of these recent social reforms. 
   
In the future, the social security system should ensure more fundamental rights and interests 
for the disadvantaged. For the time being the country's social security system is not able to cover 
the population of 800 million in rural areas. Broadened coverage should be developed, with 
security programs applying to the general population. Specifically, the social insurance system 
should be applied to the whole employed population, with a basic social security system available 
to all members of society, not only those with urban employers. The social security system should 
strive to achieve sustainability. 
 
3.2.2 Comprehensive taxation reform 
 
The current tax system has resulted in the concentration of wealth with a small number of 
people, a situation which is harmful to a healthy development of the national economy and social 
stability. There is the same urgent need to enhance the  reform of taxation policies and establish a 
sound mechanism that embodies government policies. Current problems mainly exist around 
personal income taxes where taxation starts at a low level of income. Mid- and low-level earners 
pay a significant proportion of their income in tax, but the government has no efficient control over 
higher-income taxation. No sufficient adjustments are made on higher income earners, hence 
serious personal income tax evasion occurs. The existing tax system definitely worsens the 
inequality situation.  
 
The priority for future income taxation reform will be to formulate a reasonable income tax 
lower cut-off line while intensifying taxation management for high-income groups. If China fails to 
find a resolution to the unfair income tax situation, the widening gap between the rich and the poor 






This paper began with providing a detailed view of Chinese productivity developments during 
the transitional period of economic reform. Relying on official statistics, we calculated labour 
productivity for agricultural production and for industrial production conducted by enterprises of 
different ownerships. Our major findings are that these production units all showed increasing 
trends of labour productivity and that comparatively, the industrial sector has been much more 
productive than the agricultural sector. Within industrial sectors, the smaller has been the 
state-owned share, the higher has been labour productivity. Due to data limitations, we treated 
non-state-owned and non-collective owned industrial enterprises as a single group and were not 
able to determine whether specific enterprises in each category demonstrated growing productivity 
over time.  
 
Next we examined poverty in China. Evidence from the World Bank, the National Bureau of 
Statistics and independent researchers all support the conclusion that China has made great 
achievements in reducing poverty. In order to see whether the decrease in poverty resulted from 
increasing productivity, we carried out regressions and our findings were somewhat surprising. In 
terms of total economy labour productivity, poverty seemed to be significantly affected, i.e. higher 
labour productivity would lead to a lower poverty rate. But if agricultural labour productivity and 
industrial labour productivity were used as explanatory variables instead of total labour 
productivity, our results indicate that only higher industrial labour productivity is related to poverty 
reduction. Higher agricultural labour productivity might not make any significant contribution to 
reducing poverty, and may even make things worse due to terms of trade effects. 
 
When we included the inequality variable into our regressions, the results were inconsistent 
with inequality having a significant influence on poverty. Certainly it needs to be pointed out that 
caution is called for due to the data and statistical weaknesses discussed, although the general result 
of productivity reducing poverty is supported in the literature.  
 
In the last part of this paper, we discussed briefly the factors affecting future Chinese 
productivity growth: technological innovation, further structural adjustment and human resource 
exploitation through education. In addition, good governance is essential to help to maintain a 
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Appendix 1:  Estimating Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for Chinese  State-owned 
Industrial Enterprises 
  
There are many related studies in the literature, but almost all use data from before 1995. We 
have therefore calculated a TFP index with our own data from Table 1-6 and Table 1-7. 
 






Where   Y is real output 
   K is real capital input, proxied by real fixed assets  
   L is the number of workers employed 
  α and β are the production elasticities of capital and labour, respectively 
 
To estimate the elasticities of capital and labour, further assumptions need to be made, i.e. if 
production is believed to exhibit constant returns to scale, α+β =1 will be imposed as a restriction. 
In this circumstance, model (A) will be applied. If returns to scale varies, we will prefer Model (B) 
in estimating elasticities.  
Models : 
(A)  ln (Yi /Li ) = γ + α ln ( Ki / Li )+ εi                              
(B)  ln Yi = γ + α ln Ki + β ln Li +εi   
where the errors in each model are assumed to be independent and identically distributed. 
 
We use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method and obtain the estimation results in Table 
A1-1. Theoretically, both of these two models are acceptable and both give us empirical estimates 
that are highly statistically significant. Most likely it is not a practical assumption that state firms 
produce with constant returns to scale: in this sense we think Model B is more appropriate. 
 
The TFP estimates presented in Table 1-8 are calculated using these estimated elasticities, i.e. 
Ai=Yi/(Ki
αLi
β).  These TFP estimates should obviously be regarded as exploratory only, given 
evidence from the low Durbin-Watson statistics of highly autocorrelated errors and the fact that 
Cobb-Douglas production technology has been imposed.  Further, note that the elasticities are 
estimated based on the restriction that A is constant across all years, an assumption that is clearly 
not valid when we wish to discuss TFP growth.  Nonetheless, no other estimates of these elasticities 
are available for China for the period of interest, and it is likely that China’s SOEs do have 
increasing returns to scale approaching the extent implied by these estimates.  Therefore, although 
not to be regarded as precise, the growth in the estimated TFP series in Table 1-8 is at least 





Table A1-1:  Estimates of Capital and Labour Elasticities for SOEs, 1980-2001 
Parameters Model  A  Model  B 
Constant  0.3796 (11.11 ***)  -3.1045 (1.589) 
α  0.6124 (7.329 ***)  0.7429 (8.307***) 
β  0.3876 (implied)  0.6684 (4.036***) 
R
2  0.8916 0.8340 
D-W   0.8807  1.0720 
Note: t-ratios of every parameter is listed in the parentheses, and *** means the estimation parameter is statistically 




Appendix 2:  Comparison of Data Sources on Chinese Economic Growth 
 
In section 1.1, we used official statistics and obtained China’s GDP levels and growth rates. 
Between 1978 and 2001, nominal GDP increased from 362.4 billion yuan to 9593.3 billion yuan, 
which represents a 15.3 per cent average annual growth rate. In terms of real GDP, the level of 
2871.7 billion yuan (in 1978 constant prices) was reached in 2001. This means that real GDP 
demonstrated an average annual growth rate of 9.4 per cent per year over the 1978-2001 period.  
 
Now we want to compare the official statistics with those developed by Angus Maddison 
(2001). In Table A2-1, we provide levels of GDP and per capita GDP from both sources. Because 
different base years were used in these studies and constant price series are not expressed in the 
same base year, the two sets of data are not directly comparable. We therefore converted official 
GDP and per capita GDP values from 1978 yuan to 1990 yuan using the Chinese GDP deflator 
derived from Table 1-1, then into 1990 U.S. dollars using the 1990 PPP estimate from the Penn 
World Tables and shown in Table 2-2.  The adjusted official GDP and per capita GDP estimates, as 




From Tables A2-1 and A2-2 we see that the official GDP and official per capita GDP estimates 
are much lower than those of Maddison. Based on Maddison’s estimates, real GDP in 1978 was 
935884 million U.S. dollars, while the adjusted official GDP estimate shows a level of only 153125 
million U.S. dollars, the former being about 6.1 times the latter. And even in 1999, although there 
has been much convergence between the estimates at this point, Maddison’s estimates are still 3.9 
times the adjusted official estimates.
26 This shows that Chinese official GDP statistics have been 
highly underestimated. 
 
In addition to level comparisons, we would also like to compare the growth rates between the 
two sources. Calculations are given in Table A2-3. Maddison’s data show that real GDP grew by 
7.3 per cent annually between 1978 and 1999 and GDP per capita grew by 5.9 per cent annually 
over the same period, compared to the official estimates of 9.6 per cent and 8.2 per cent. 
Maddison’s estimates are 2.3 percentage points lower. Now if we look at the growth rates during 
1980s and 1990s separately, the same conclusion is evident. For the 1980s (including 1978 and 
1979), the average annual growth rates of GDP and per capita GDP are 7.0 per cent and 5.5 per cent, 
but in the same period, official growth rates are 9.0 per cent and 7.5 per cent. And for the 1990s, 
GDP and GDP per capita grew, respectively, at 7.6 per cent per year and 6.4 per cent per year 
according to Maddison and 10.4 per cent per year and 9.2 per cent per year according to official 
statistics. 
                                                        
25 The PPP we used to convert Chinese GDP comes from the Penn World Tables, and Maddison used the same source to obtain his 
own estimates. Therefore, the difference between official estimates and Maddison’s estimates cannot result from the PPP factor.    
26 We should note that the population estimates used by Angus Maddison are very similar, both in levels and growth rates, to the 
































1978 935884  956165  979  362410 962590  376 
1979 1007734  969005  1040  389953     
1980 1046781  981235  1067  420396  987050  426 
1981 1096587  993861  1103  442503     
1982 1192494  1000281  1192  482368     
1983 1294304  1023288  1265  534917     
1984 1447661  1036825  1396  616097     
1985 1599201  1051040  1522  699089 1058510  660 
1986 1703671  1066790  1597  761061 1075070  708 
1987 1849563  1084035  1706  849127 1093000  777 
1988 2000236  1101630  1816  944803 1110260  851 
1989 2044100  1118650  1827  983218 1127040  872 
1990 2109400  1135185  1858  1020909 1143330  893 
1991 2232306  1150780  1940  1114773 1158230  962 
1992 2444569  1164970  2098  1273509 1171710  1087 
1993 2683336  1178440  2277  1445291 1185170  1219 
1994 2950104  1191835  2475  1628308 1198500  1359 
1995 3196343  1204855  2653  1799366 1211210  1486 
1996 3433255  1217550  2820  1971873 1223890  1611 
1997 3657242  1230075  2973  2146192 1236260  1736 
1998 3873352  1242700  3117  2313993 1248100  1854 
1999 4082513  1252704  3259  2479233 1259090  1969 
Source:  1. Columns (1), (2) and (3) are from The World Economy: A millennial perspective (2001), Table C3-b Table C3-a and  
                  Table C3-c. 











Table A2-2: Comparison of Maddison’s Estimates and Official Estimates 
 
 
Official Series, converted to 
1990 yuan with the Chinese 
GDP deflator (1978=100) 
value of 181.68 
 
Converted to 1990 U.S. dollars 
with the 1990 PPP estimate of 4.3

































1978  658437 684  153125  159  6.1  6.2 
1979  708478   164762    6.1   
1980  763787 774  177625  180  5.9  5.9 
1981  803952   186966    5.9   
1982  876380   203809    5.9   
1983  971852   226012    5.7   
1984  1119342   260312    5.6   
1985  1270125 1200  295378  279  5.4  5.5 
1986  1382717 1286  321562  299  5.3  5.3 
1987  1542718 1411  358772  328  5.2  5.2 
1988  1716545 1546  399196  360  5.0  5.1 
1989  1786338 1585  415428  369  4.9  5.0 
1990  1854816 1622  431353  377  4.9  4.9 
1991  2025351 1749  471012  407  4.7  4.8 
1992  2313747 1975  538081  459  4.5  4.6 
1993  2625846 2216  610662  515  4.4  4.4 
1994  2958356 2468  687990  574  4.3  4.3 
1995  3269139 2699  760265  628  4.2  4.2 
1996  3582555 2927  833152  681  4.1  4.1 
1997  3899262 3154  906805  734  4.0  4.1 
1998  4204128 3368  977704  783  4.0  4.0 
1999  4504341 3577  1047521  832  3.9  3.9 
Source: Columns (1) and (2) are from Table 1-2 in Section 1.1. 
Note:    Official estimates are first converted from 1978 yuan to 1990 yuan using the Chinese GDP deflator, then to 1990 U.S. 




































  7.3 1.4  5.9 9.6  1.4 8.2 
1978-1990 
  7.0 1.5  5.5 9.0  1.5 7.5 
1990-1999 
  7.6 1.2  6.4  10.4 1.2 9.2 
 Source: These compound growth rates are calculated from Tables A2-1 and A2-2. 
      
Researchers have tried to reconcile the two sets of estimates. For example, Wu (2000) argued 
that the downward bias of Chinese official GDP might result from the insufficient coverage of 
production activities and the distorted price system. As to the upward bias of GDP growth, it could 
be explained either by using deflators that under-deflated the levels of GDP or by enterprises 
intentionally exaggerating their output improvement so as to be rewarded.
27 In addition, the gradual 
movement from the old material product system (MPS) to the internationally adopted system of 
national accounts (SNA) may also have caused an upward bias in the estimation of China’s GDP 
growth. 
 
                                                        
27 Wu (2002) used his self-constructed dataset to test the upward-bias hypothesis of Chinese official industrial growth rates. His 
estimations strongly demonstrated that according to official statistics, the growth rates were overstated by 1.2 to 4.1 percentage 
points in different periods of post-reform time.       
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Appendix 3: Economic Reform and the Development of A New Social Security 
System in China 
 
As is well known, a social security system is an integral part of a market economy. In the 
process of reforming its planned economy into a market economy, China has made great efforts to 
improve its social security system. A sound social security system is a means of maintaining social 
equality and social stability. In China, it also facilitates economic reform by allowing state firms to 
transfer responsibility for redundant workers from themselves to the state. This permits these firms 
to lay off the workers and improve productivity growth. 
 
This appendix looks at the development of the Chinese social security system and the 
importance of establishing a new social security system for China’s economic reform. A brief 
review of the Chinese social security system will be provided first. The following four sections 
explain the need for reform and the new look of the social security system in four major fields: the 
old-age pension system, the unemployment insurance system, the health insurance system and the 
minimum living standard security system.     
   
A3.1 A Brief Review of the Chinese Security System Reform 
 
The term “social security system” is defined as a very broad concept in China. The 
Government of China announced in April 2002 that a basic social security system had been 
established, which includes social insurance, social relief, social welfare as well as social mutual 
help and special care for disabled people and family members of revolutionary martyrs. 
 
Reforms on the social security system were originally proposed during the economic reform of 
the early 1980s. But only when the objective of pursuing a market economy was made clear in the 
early 1990s were several essential reform procedures in the social insurance system and the social 
relief system finally undertaken.  
 
The social insurance system is a system in which the government participates or enforces the 
participation of employers and affected individuals in raising funds so as to protect individuals 
against economic risks. The Chinese social insurance system consists of old-age pensions, 
unemployment insurance, health insurance, industrial injury insurance and maternity benefits. Of 
these, old-age pensions, unemployment insurance and health insurance are the main areas in which 
reform is crucially necessary and where reforms have actually focused. 
 
The social relief system refers to the support by the government and society to citizens who are 
unable to maintain their basic living standard. The Chinese social relief aims to guarantee a  
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minimum standard of living to all urban citizens. This coverage is expected to be extended to the 
rural population in the near future.  
 
A3.2 Old-age Pension System 
 
A3.2.1 Economic reform and the necessity of pension system reform 
 
The Chinese old-age pension system reform was proposed in 1984, in accordance with reform 
of state-owned enterprises. Before the pension reform, enterprises were responsible for paying 
pension premiums for their employees. The linking of old-age pensions to enterprises instead of to 
the beneficiaries greatly impeded labour mobility in China and made it quite difficult for state 
enterprises to lay off redundant workers to achieve higher labour productivity. Under the old 
system, workers faced a high risk of receiving no pension after retirement if they quit their current 
jobs. Seldom were people willing to leave until the benefits were realized. Even when workers 
were laid off, they would not take jobs in other firms because they would lose their pension rights. 
According to a survey carried out by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security in 1999, 83.0 per 
cent of the laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises worried that their old-age pension would 
not be guaranteed if employment relations with their former enterprises terminated.  
 
At the same time, responsibility for paying pension benefits was a major financial burden for 
state enterprises. Economic reform brought more autonomy to state enterprises and enterprises’ 
profits and losses became more and more a reflection of their production performances. For firms 
with losses, survival was an issue and their pension premium responsibility would only make 
matters worse. Others were unwilling to accept their responsibility since their contributions would 
be used to pay benefits to other employees. In this sense, their profits were shared by other 
enterprises. Therefore they would always find excuses to escape premium payment.  
 
A3.2.2 The new pension system: a joint employer-employee contribution  
 
The Chinese government, in realizing the necessity of reforming the old pension system, has 
taken a series of measures since 1991. The major effort was to introduce the joint 
employer-employee contribution system that combines general funding with personal accounts to 
replace the original pay-as-you-go system.
28  
 
Under this new system, employees themselves pay part of basic pension premiums, which will 
go directly to their personal accounts. The personal accounts are independent from the enterprises. 
                                                        
28 The pay-as-you-go system is one of the two representative systems that prevail in the world. It was first introduced in Germany in 
the 1880s under the Rule of Bismarck. In the system, pension payment is totally determined by contributions at a certain point of 
time and there is no accumulation for future use. Essentially this mode means the current generation’s workers support previous 




No matter where a worker is employed, his/her contribution to the personal account will be 
accumulated. Once workers retire, pension benefits will be paid directly from their personal 
account and the longer they have contributed, the more they will receive after retirement.  
 
Enterprises contribute premium payments to both general funding and their employees’ 
personal accounts, but they are no longer responsible for income support for those laid-off workers. 
If workers have made contributions to the new pension system over fifteen years, they will also 
receive benefit from the general funding in addition to the benefit from the personal account.     
 
Since the adoption of the new pension system, more and more people have participated and 
become beneficiaries. As shown in Table A3-1, 77.8 million employees joined the new system in 
1992, of which 65.4 million were from SOEs. And in 2002, the total number of contributors 
reached 111.3 million. The number of beneficiaries has increased too, from 16.81 million in 1992 
to 36.08 million in 2002. From the table, we see that the ratio of beneficiaries to contributors in the 
new pension system increased more than 10 percentage points over 1992-2002. 
 
Table A3-1   Number of Contributors and Beneficiaries In the New Pension 
System (1992-2002) 
 
 Contributors  (millions) Beneficiaries  (millions) 
Year  Of which:  of which: 







1992 77.75  65.4  11.77  16.81  13.39  3.38 21.62 
1993 80.08  65.91  13.19  18.39  14.51  3.76 22.96 
1994 84.94  70.06  13.25  20.79  16.67  3.94 24.48 
1995 87.38  71.31  13.7  22.41  17.87  4.29 25.65 
1996 87.58  70.45  14.55  23.58  17.57  4.67 26.92 
1997 86.71  68.88  14.37  25.33  19.84  5.08 29.21 
1998 84.76  66.47  13.7  27.27  21.44  5.25 32.17 
1999 95.02  64.54  14.79  29.84  21.96  5.71 31.40 
2000 104.48  64.67  14.7  31.70  22.84  5.94 30.34 
2001 108.02      33.81      31.30 
2002 111.28      36.08      32.42 
Source:  1.Labour Statistic Yearbook of China, 2001, Table 8-16 
              2. Labour Statistic Communiqué 2001 and Labour Statistic Communiqué 2002 
 
 
Table A3-2 shows the financial situation of the pension system. The new system received 
revenue of 317.2 billion yuan in 2002, while comparatively, it received 36.6 billion yuan in 1992. 
As to the expenses, they have increased from 32.2 billion yuan to 284.29 billion yuan over the 
period 1992-2002. Revenues and expenses are nearly balanced every year, reflecting that there is  
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still little accumulation in the new pension system.                                    
 
A3.2.3 Existing problems and reasons for their existence 
 
Introduction of personal accounts removed the barrier to labour mobility between enterprises 
and laying off redundant workers, which was believed to be an important contribution to higher 
labour productivity, now became possible for state enterprises. But the joint contribution system 
did not completely reduce the financial burden of state enterprises. New regulations require 20 per 
cent of enterprises’ total wage bill to be paid for pension benefits. Of the total contribution, only a 
small proportion that is equal to 3 per cent of employees’ wages will go to employees’ personal 
accounts. All the remaining contributions from the enterprises are accumulated as general funding. 
Such a big proportion of contributions is much like an additional tax that is levied on enterprises. 
Therefore it may possibly lead enterprises to continue escaping or delaying premium payments.  
 
Table A3-2: Financial Statistics of Old-age Pension System 
(1992-2002) 
 
Revenue (billion yuan)  Expense (billion yuan) 
for which  For which 
year  Total  SOE Urban  COETotal  SOE Urban  COE 
1992 36.58  31.16  5.14 32.19  27.17  4.94 
1993 50.35  41.21  7.38 47.06  38.25  7.61 
1994 70.74  59.86  9.12 66.11  55.15  10.23 
1995 95.01  80.26  11.13  84.76  71.62  11.82 
1996 117.18  96.86  13.92  103.19  86.18  15.1 
1997 133.79  113.08  13.63  125.13  105.86  16.75 
1998 145.90  121.37  15.01  151.16  128.89  19.32 
1999 196.51  156.7  17.99  192.49  159.08  23.63 
2000 227.81  169.83  19.98  211.55  164.68  26.52 
2001 248.90      232.10     
2002 317.15         284.29         
  Source: 1. Labour Statistic Yearbook, 2001, Table 8-17 
               2.Labour Statistical Communiqué 2001 and Labour Statistical Communiqué 2002 
  Note:  Pension revenues include both pension premium and general funding. Pension expenses 
include pension benefits and administrative cost.    
 
 
Another problem of the current pension system may concern the personal accounts. As some 
researchers have pointed out, the personal accounts in China are actually empty accounts (Zhou, 
1999), i.e. there are indeed no credits in the personal accounts because workers’ contributions to 
their personal accounts are actually used for paying benefits of the current retirees. In this sense, 




However, existence of these problems has its own reasons. Both problems derive from the 
needs of certain groups to bear the transition costs. As China rejected the old pay-as-you-go system, 
the most affected people were those retired and those still in working ages. Under the old system 
there was no accumulated funding that could be paid to retired workers and it was also not possible 
for the government to bear the high costs totally by itself. Therefore enterprises and current 
employees sharing part of the costs became necessary.           
 
A3.2.4 Future policy choices 
 
The current problems should be transitional. But the Chinese pension system needs other 
funding resources. One contentious method is to sell state-owned assets and to channel the earnings 
into the pension system. Supporters for this action argue it will make state enterprises face more 
market power once their assets are sold in the financial market, and at the same time, raised funds 
from the market would reduce financial burden in the current system. Opposers argue that before 
the Chinese financial market is fully developed and before the relevant regulations of dealing with 
state-owned assets are issued, selling state-owned assets will only result in devaluation or even 
value losses of the state assets.  
 
In addition to searching for new funding resources, China may also try some methods from the 
pensioner’s point of view. The flexible retirement policy, as discussed by Nicholas Barr (2001), 
might be one choice under China’s current situation. To allow a gradual transition from work into 
retirement instead of a forced retirement at a certain age will reduce pressures on pension finance at 
the same time leading to more efficient use of labour. Another choice might be as proposed by 
Martin Feldstein (1998), namely replacing the full benefit payments with partial payments. In other 
words, the government can consider to only bridge the gap between retirees’ previous contribution 
and their income after retirement. This will cost the pension system much less and will have no 
negative effect on the working population. 
 
A3.3 Unemployment Insurance System  
 
A3.3.1 Evolution of the unemployment insurance system 
 
Unemployment has never been a real problem in China until the early 1990s.
29 As China 
gradually reformed its economy towards a more effective production pattern, enterprises began to 
lay off redundant workers. Especially after 1997 when reform accelerated and the laid-off policy 
was introduced widely throughout China, many workers lost their jobs.  
 
                                                        
29 Before the late 1990s, the Chinese government did not treat the workers laid off in the process of economic reform as officially 
unemployed. Instead, they were defined as still employed but temporarily on leave. But in fact, those laid-off persons were 
unemployed according to the general definition of unemployment.  
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To protect the interest of those laid-off workers, the Chinese government developed a 
re-employment project in 1995. Setting up re-employment service centers was at the heart of this 
project. The re-employment service center is like an individual department in the enterprises. All 
the laid-off workers are asked to register and to sign 3-year contracts so that they would receive 
basic living expenses as well as labour skill training or job-seeking consulting services, both of 
which aim to help them to be re-employed. According to the statistics of Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security (MOLSS), 1.60 million laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises in 1996 
found new jobs with the assistance of the re-employment service. This number increased to 4.34 
million in 1997, followed by 6.10 million in 1998, 4.92 million in 1999 and 3.61 million in 2000.                
 
In the first few years after its implementation, the re-employment project played an important 
role in maintaining income security of those laid-off. However, it could not prevent the continued 
declines in state enterprise employment. Because all the re-employment service centers were set up 
in the enterprises, enterprises still needed to pay basic living expenses for the laid-off workers and 
they were also responsible for part of the administration cost of re-employment service centers. In 
this sense, the re-employment project did not free enterprises of the financial burden. Instead it was 
rather an alternative form of realizing enterprises’ obligation to its workers. Suppose if the 
enterprises were unable to make their payment, the heavy burden would have to be totally born by 




A3.3.2 The new Chinese unemployment insurance system 
 
Starting in 2001, China began to close all its re-employment service centers. An effort was 
made to cover all the laid-off workers through the unemployment insurance system instead of 
channeling them into re-employment service centers.  
 
The new Chinese unemployment insurance system is similar to the old-age pension system, i.e. 
the joint employer-employee contribution system. The system was officially established in 1999,
30 
which required a standardized contribution not only from enterprises but also from employees 
themselves. Employees are now responsible to contribute 1% of their wages to the personal 
account as premiums and if they become unemployed, they can receive corresponding insurance 
payment that is based on their contribution.  
 
Table A3-3 shows by 2002, 101.8 million people contributed to the unemployment insurance 
system and the total revenue has increased from 4.5 billion yuan in 1996 to 21.56 billion yuan in 
2002. A total of 4.40 million received insurance benefits in 2002.      
 
                                                        
30 Since 1993, the Government of China carried out reform on the unemployment insurance system to alleviate unemployment 
pressure. But not until 1999 was the legitimate regulation of Unemployment Insurance issued.    
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1996 83.33  3.31  4.52  2.73 
1997 79.61  3.19  4.69  3.63 
1998 79.28  1.58  7.26  5.61 
1999 98.52  2.71  12.52  9.16 
2000 103.26  3.30  16.04  12.34 
2001 103.55  3.12  18.70  15.70 
2002 101.82  4.40  21.56  18.66 
Source: 1. Labour Statistic Yearbook of China, 2001, Table 8-19 
   2. Labour Statistical Communiqué 2001 and Labour Statistical Communiqué 2002 
Note: Here what we mean by contributors refers to people who have their personal accounts and have paid 
premiums to those accounts. Beneficiaries refer to people who have received insurance benefits.   
 
A3.4 Health Insurance System 
 
A3.4.1  Free health care services for urban workers under the old health insurance system  
 
Health insurance was another important issue in reforming the Chinese social insurance system. 
Under the old system, health care service was freely provided to workers employed in urban state 
enterprises. Workers enjoyed free health care no matter whether the health service was really 
necessary or not. Costs of employee health service fee payment took away a large proportion of 
enterprises’ profit. MOLSS estimates that from 1978 to 1997, expense on health care increased 28 
fold, while during the same period, the growth of GDP per capita was just 16 fold. It was believed 
that 20-30 per cent of the health expenditures were wasteful.  
 
A3.4.2 New look of the health insurance system 
  
The establishment of the basic health insurance system for urban employees in 1998 signaled 
the essential reform in Chinese health insurance. This new system ended the history of free 
health-care service and required workers to shoulder part of health-care costs by means of paying 
premiums to their personal accounts. The personal accounts accumulations are the first resource 
that rebates will come from. Only if the total expense exceeds the credits in the personal account, 
general funding will cover parts of the costs.  
 
Under the new health insurance system, the incentive to receive unnecessary health service is 
curbed effectively. Enterprises now only need to contribute a fixed amount
31 of their wage bill to 
                                                        
31 Enterprises pay 6 per cent of their wage bill to both the general funding and employees’ personal account. See appendix table-1 for 
more details.  
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fulfill the general health funding instead of paying for all their employees’ health service fees.   
 
Since the new regulation took effect, there have been 94.0 million workers who participated in 
the system and total revenue of 60.8 billion yuan has been collected by 2002, ten times the 1998 
level.  
     
Table A3-4: Statistics of Health Insurance System (1998-2002) 
 
Year  Number of Contributors 
(millions) 
Number of Beneficiaries 
(millions) 







1998 5.09  4.02  1.08 132.34  105.55 26.79  6.06  5.33 
1999 5.94  4.70  1.24 129.42  101.24 28.18  8.99  6.91 
2000 23.06  18.18  4.88       17.00  12.45 
2001 72.86  54.71  18.15        38.40  24.40 
2002 94.00  69.26  24.74        60.78  40.94 
  Source: 1. Labour Statistic Yearbook of China, 2001, Table 8-19, Table 9-10 
               2.Labour Statistical Communiqué, 2001 and 2002 
 
  
A3.4.3 Health care service in rural areas 
 
Since 1998, reform on the health care insurance system has been gradually implemented and 
now the new health insurance system covers all urban employees. However, it remains difficult in 
rural areas to set up a health insurance system that is similar to that in urban areas, although the 
need for health care service in rural areas is actually much greater. 
 
First, in rural China, most enterprises provide little or no health insurance to their employees. 
Due to the low income levels in rural areas, rural citizens are not able to pay any insurance 
premiums. Mandatory insurance premiums from rural people will only exacerbate the financial 
hardship they face. Financing the rural health care system hence has to depend mostly on the 
central government’s subsidy. But the state subsidy is after all limited since it relies on funding 
collected by the local government in a certain degree.  
 
Moreover, labour mobility from rural areas to urban areas has become very common. 
Therefore a unified rural health insurance system will face risks of distortion. Reform in rural areas 
moves many farmers out of agricultural production and these people are employed temporarily in 
urban areas. But working in urban areas does not mean that they are subject to urban health 
insurance and once they suffer from severe illness, they usually go back to the hospitals in their 
hometowns for treatments because few of these people can afford the expensive health care service 




A3.5 Minimum living standard security system 
 
In China, the minimum living standard security is regarded as the last resort for laid-off 
workers, the unemployed and the poor urban dwellers. In 1993, the Chinese government began to 
set up the minimum living standard security system. By 1999, a system that included all cities and 
organic county towns had been established.   
 
The minimum living standard security system provides security on a needs basis. Unlike the 
pension benefit or the unemployment insurance benefits, the minimum living standard security is 
not determined on the basis of individual workers but households. No matter whether the family 
members are working or have been laid off, receiving unemployment insurance or having no 
income, only if the average monthly income of this family is lower than a certain level (often called 
the security line), will the minimum living standard security be offered.   
 
Because different cities have different costs of living, the minimum living standard lines are 
not set at the same level throughout the country, instead, they vary across cities. For example, in 
2002, the highest security line set by Shenzhen was about 299 yuan per person per month, but in 
Nanchang, the security line was much lower, at 143 yuan per person per month (Table A3-5). 
 
The minimum living standard security system is tending to ensure more and more people basic 
living standards. As we can see from Table A3-6, the number of beneficiaries greatly increased 
from 0.9 million in 1997 to 20.7 million in 2002.  
 
It is worth noticing that in 1998 and in 2001, the number of beneficiaries showed dramatic 
increases. In 1998, when the Chinese economic reform made essential advancement through laying 
off redundant workers in urban enterprises, this system absorbed those who failed to benefit from 
the unemployment insurance system. Later in 2001, when the Chinese government gradually 
closed all the re-employment centers, which deteriorated the living of unemployed people who had 
been masked by the re-employment centers but were now opened, many more people became 
beneficiaries of this system. The same trend continued in 2002. It can be expected that before all 
the laid-off workers are transferred to the unemployment insurance system, the number of 








Table A3-5: The Thresholds for Receipt of Minimum Living 
Standard Security in 36 Major Chinese Cities (2002) 
(yuan per month per person)
City  Security 
Line  City  Securi
ty Line 
Beijing 290  Guangzhou  300 
Tianjin 241  Nanning 190 
Shijiazhuang 182  Haikou  221 
Taiyuan 156  Chengdu 178 
Huhehaote 153  Chongqing  185 
Shenyang 205  Kunming  190 
Changchun 169  Guiyang  156 
Harbin 200  Lasa  170 
Shanghai 280  Xi'an  180 
Nanjing 220  Lanzhou  172 
Hangzhou 270-300  Xining  155 
Hefei 169  Yinchuan  160 
Fuzhou 200-220 Wulumuqi  156 
Nanchang 143  Dalian  221 
Jinan 208  Qingdao  200-210 
Zhengzhou 180  Ningbo  260 
Wuhan 210  Shenzhen  290-344   
Changsha  180-200   Xiamen  265-315  













Table A3-6 Number of Beneficiaries in the Minimum Living Standard Security 
System (1996-2002) 
 
Year  Number of Beneficiaries 
(millions)  Average annual growth rate (%) 
1996    0.85   
1997    0.88  3.53 
1998    1.84  109.44 
1999    2.66  44.43 
2000    4.03  51.41 
2001    11.71  190.78 
2002    20.65  76.36 
      Sources: Statistical Communiqué of Chinese Civil Affair, http://www.mca.gov.cn/statistics/shuju.html,  




Through examining the four key components of the Chinese social security system, we 
conclude that reforming the social security system was highly necessary since the old 
enterprise-based system impeded the progress of economic reform. From what we have discussed, 
introduction of the joint employer-employee contribution model into the social security system was 
the most helpful change. In conclusion, Table A3-7 puts together specific features of its application 
in each insurance system so that the reader can easily appreciate the similarities and differences in 
the application of the new model. Table A3-8 summarizes specific regulations that have 
contributed to the current social security system. 
 
Potential problems in the Chinese old-age pension system have been pointed out. Although the 
existence of these problems is thought to be a transitional phenomenon in the process of 
transforming the old pay-as-you-go pension system into the new funding based pension system, it 
remains uncertain as to how and when they will be resolved. Exclusion of rural people from the 
urban Chinese health insurance and the impossibility of setting up a rural health insurance system 
that is similar to the urban health insurance system have also been mentioned.                
 
Actually, “there is no ideal model for pension reform” (qtd. in Barr, 2001:chapter 8). This is 
also true for reform of other systems. China needs to take its own economic situation into 
consideration and any reform that can facilitate Chinese economic reform at the same time as 




Table A3-7 New Features of the Chinese Social Insurance System  
 
Responsibility for Basic Insurance Premiums 
 






Contribution to the 









Up to 20% of enterprises’ 
total wage bill 
Equal to 3% of 
employees’ wages  
8% of personal 
income 
Two parts:  
 
(1)  1/120 of the accumulated sum of personal account credit per 
month.  
(2)  If the length of contribution is 15 years or over, one can also 
receive general pension. The monthly general pension benefit 
equals to 20% of local average monthly wage in the previous 
year.  
If the length of contribution is less than 15 years, general 
funding may will be provided in the following way: (a) Every 
one year contribution will make a retiree qualify for 2 months 
pension payment from the general funding; (b) Pensioner will 






Up to 6% of enterprises’ 
total wage bill  
Usually equal to 
30% of enterprises’ 
total contribution 




1.  Deduct from personal accounts 
2.  If health care expense exceeds what the personal account can 
afford, the extra cost that is above 5% of the personal wages is 
paid by workers themselves but in different levels:  
(a)  If total expense is less than 5000 yuan, workers 
themselves pay 10%-20% of the extra cost;  
(b)  If total expense is between 5000-10000 yuan, workers 
themselves pay 8%-10% of the extra cost; 
(c)  If total expense is more than 10000 yuan, workers 
themselves pay 2% of the extra cost.  
All the other extra cost will be rebated by general funding. 
      
Unemployment 
Insurance 
2% of enterprises’ total 
wage bill 
 
1% of personal 
income 
Monthly payment at a rate that is higher than the minimum urban 
living standard but lower than local minimum wage rate. Length of 
receiving unemployment benefits depends on the length of 
contribution. 
 
(a)  If contribute 1-5 years, can receive benefits for 12 months 
at most; 
(b)  If contribute 5-10 year, can receive benefits for 18 months 
at most; 
(c)  If contribute over 10 years, can receive benefits for 24 
months at most.  
 
Note:  1. The obligatory contributors to the social insurance system include the following economic units and their employees: (1) all urban enterprises (eg: SOEs, urban COEs, foreign funded 
enterprises and private-owned enterprises, (2) State administration department, (3) non-profit institutions, (4) social organizations.  
Responsibility of contributions by Township and village enterprises (TVEs) and their employees are subject to local government’s requirement.   
     2. If a worker has a personal income that is less than 60% of the average income level, the income base for calculating his pension premium will be 60% of the average income level. If a worker 
has a personal income that is over 300% of the average income level, the income base for calculating his pension premium will exclude the extra amount. As to the personal income that is 
over 200% but below 300% of the average income level, the income base for calculating his pension premium can include part or all the extra amount.      
 
80









  1984 
  
¾  Decision on Reforming Old-age Pension System for Enterprise Employees (State Council 1991 No.33) 
¾  Notification on Further Reforming Old-age Pension System for Enterprise Employees (State Council, 1995 No.6) 
¾  Decision on Establishing a Uniform Basic Old-Age Insurance System for Enterprise Employees (State Council, 1997 
No.26) 
¾  Notification on Decentralizing Management of Mutual Assistance Program (State Council, 1998 No.28)  
 
Health insurance 
  1988 
 
¾  Decision on Establishing the Basic Medical Insurance System for Urban Employees (State Council, 1998 No.44) 
¾  Notification on Strengthening Management of Urban Employees’ Personal Accounts for Basic Health Insurance 
(Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2002 NO.6) 












¾  Regulations of Unemployment Insurance (State Council, 1999 No.258) 
¾  Regulation on Application for Unemployment Insurance (Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2000 No. 8) 
¾  Notification on Establishing a Recording System for Unemployment Insurance (Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 











¾  Trial Procedures for Industrial Injury Insurance for Enterprise Employees (Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 1996 
No.266) 
¾  Regulation of Industrial Injury Insurance (State Council, 2003 No.375) 
 
Childbirth insurance 
  1988 
 




living standard security  1993 
 
¾  Notification on Establishing a Minimum Living Standard Security System in Urban Areas (State Council, 1997 No.29) 
¾  Regulation of Urban Minimum Living Standard (State Council, 1999 No.271) 
¾  Notification on Further Strengthening the Minimum Living Standard Security System in Urban Areas (State Council, 
2001, No.87)   
 
 